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Federal lawmakers often praise the American state governments as 
―laboratories of democracy‖ conducting policy experiments from which other 
governments can learn.  However, federalism scholarship recognizes that the federal 
government has strong incentives to preempt state policy and impose federal 
mandates in trying to achieve national policy goals.  The safeguards of state power in 
the federal system – political, institutional, and democratic constraints – have 
changed and weakened over time, leaving the state governments vulnerable to the 
political interests of the national government.  Like other interest groups, the states 
have developed techniques to safeguard the balance of power in the federal system as 
well as communicate their policy interests to national lawmakers and educate others 
about their unique policy developments.   
  
Prior studies of American federalism have relied on the behavior of public 
official associations representing multiple state governments as the source of 
information about intergovernmental advocacy and state policy goals.  This 
dissertation argues that the study of aggregate intergovernmental interests through the 
positions of the associations conceals variation in the advocacy activity and goals of 
the individual state governments.  Quantitative analysis of patterns in state lobbying 
behavior as well as qualitative analysis of congressional hearings is conducted using a 
unique database of the hearing testimony by state government officials and public 




 Congress (1993-2004).  This demonstrates 
that the state governments are dynamic participants in federal policymaking but their 
influence is not constant across all policy areas.  Individual states are found to have 
varying levels of activity in federal policymaking which are dependent on the 
committee placement of members from the state‘s congressional delegation.  In some 
cases the states‘ capacity to develop policy expertise and craft innovative policy is 
predictive of its participation in congressional hearings but this is not as important a 
factor as expected.  Members of Congress are most likely to invite intergovernmental 
witnesses based on their relationship to the state government and, less frequently, 
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Chapter 1: The States on the Hill 
 
In September of 1999 the Subcommittee on Human Resources in the House 
Committee on Ways and Means held an oversight hearing on the child support 
enforcement program.  The subcommittee chair, Congresswoman Nancy Johnson (R-
CT), stated that the purpose of the hearing was to review the performance of the 
program which was passed in 1996 as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).  Much of PRWORA devolved welfare 
programs from the federal government to the states, but the child support legislation 
centralized data collection by creating a national employment database and 
encouraging new cooperative data-sharing relationships among the state and federal 
agencies.  It also encouraged a range of state-level programs to establish paternity, to 
identify parents owing child support payments and collect those payments, and to 
improve access and visitation for non-custodial parents.  
The chair intended to use the hearing to review the programs and assess the 
performance toward the original goals of the legislation.  She also expressed her 
intent to explore future directions for federal child support programs that would 
encourage responsible fatherhood and improve the relationships of unmarried parents.  
Her goals were reiterated by the ranking Democrat on the subcommittee, 
Congressman Ben Cardin (D-MD) who explained the history of  bipartisan agreement 
on the original legislation and expressed his support for bipartisan partnership on new 




of witnesses from the federal department of Health and Human Services, state health 
and social services agencies, a state court administrator who also represented the 
National Association of State Court Administrators, a policy analyst from a think 
tank, and an advocacy organization representing noncustodial parents.  In total there 
were eight witnesses in the hearing who were state officials representing the 
governments of Maryland, Minnesota, Virginia, Massachusetts, Ohio, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, and New York. 
Both the chair and the ranking member interacted with the witnesses from 
their own states and commended those officials for their innovative state policies 
implementing the federal legislation.  Connecticut and Maryland were the only two 
states with members of their congressional delegation on the subcommittee, but the 
members of Congress engaged with all of the state government witnesses and asked 
detailed questions about their programs.  The child support provisions of PRWORA 
gave the states several policy tools they could use to achieve federal goals.  The 
members of the committee were especially interested in learning which of the tools 
were successfully developed in each state and why they had been successful.  The 
chair‘s statements and the testimony of the state witnesses indicated that these state 
officials had been invited to testify because they were particularly successful in using 
one of these tools to achieve the federal goals.  They each discussed their most 
successful program for child support enforcement, how it was run, and how it was 
evaluated.  Many of the state witnesses discussed the fact that they were early-
adopting states that participated in pilot programs or developed their own state 




Several of the state government witnesses referenced their use of federal 
dollars to fund state child support initiatives.  The witness from Connecticut who 
spoke on behalf of the state Supreme Court and the Conference of State Court 
Administrators was most outspoken on the issue of federal funding.  He presented 
data from all of the states regarding the administration of block grants.  He also 
testified that in the last meeting of the Conference of State Court Administrators as 
well as the Conference of Chief Justices, the organizations voted on resolutions 
urging continued federal funding of the programs and asking that the judicial 
branches in the states continue to be included as stakeholders in the program. 
Members of the committee asked the state government witnesses to discuss 
the partnerships they developed with non-governmental entities, such as banks, 
hospitals, and private database vendors.  They asked about the way the states 
structured their distribution of child support monies. The members also asked for 
recommendations from the state witnesses about the administration of the federal 
grant program and the relationships established between state and federal agencies.  
They wanted to know whether the program was properly placed in the department of 
Health and Human Services or if the Internal Revenue Service should also be 
involved in program administration.   
Though the initial purpose of the hearing was oversight of the 1996 
legislation, the committee members frequently referred to their goal of crafting new 
legislation to fund programs that would improve family relations.  They asked the 
state witnesses to describe current state programs to promote responsible fatherhood.  




committee hoped to encourage in all of the states through new legislation.  The chair 
questioned the state witnesses about information that needed to be integrated and 
shared across state agencies and requested that the witnesses do some research and 
submit suggestions for program coordination after the hearing.   
The interactions in this hearing between witnesses representing the state 
governments and the members of the congressional committee illustrated the 
intergovernmental advocacy and policy learning that is encouraged by the American 
system of federalism.  Policy adoption and implementation in the United States 
overlap multiple levels of government and result in a system where the state 
governments have reason to advocate for their preferences in the federal 
policymaking process. The federal government is dependent on the states in the 
implementation and oversight of federal programs, so it has motivation to learn about 
the policy preferences and innovations in the states.  But this advocacy and learning 
take place in a political system with other purposes.  Members of Congress are 
elected by individual voters, not state governments, and they face policy pressure 
from other interest groups and their political party.  These institutional constraints 
will likely influence which state governments are privileged in their ability to access 
federal lawmakers and share their policy experiences.  State government participation 
in federal policymaking has implications for federalism and for the creation of good 








The American system of federalism was born out of political compromise and a 
desire to build government institutions that would represent the people of the new 
nation and the states that joined together to create it.  In order to protect the interests 
of the U.S. state governments many structural safeguards were necessary, overlapping 
and reinforcing one another to prevent abuse of power by one or more of the 
component governments (Bednar 2009).  Over time, the safeguards of federalism – 
including the state-based political party system, state government representation in 
the U.S. Senate, and citizens‘ loyalty to their state governments – have eroded 
(Nugent 2009; T. Smith 2008). What remains is a system of federalism where one of 
the strongest safeguards of state governments‘ interests is their ability to lobby the 
federal government for their policy preferences.   
The principle of representing state interests in the central government predates 
the American Constitution.  The colonial Continental Congress recognized that the 
geographical, historical, and economic differences between the colonies would mean 
that each would have different interests.  The earliest version of a central government 
structure, though weak and ineffectual, provided institutional representation for the 
opinions and preferences of the colonial governments (Burnett 1964).  In the modern 
political system the states continue to engage in policy advocacy in Congress, such as 
the testimony illustrated in the previous example, as well as litigation challenging 
federal policy in the courts, and professional advocacy by lobbyists hired to represent 




This dissertation seeks to understand the role of the American states as 
advocates for their interests in the federal policymaking process.  It also considers 
what members of Congress want to learn from state government officials and the 
incentives that motivate members of Congress in their interactions with officers of the 
states. Prior research has framed the interaction of the state and federal governments 
in two ways.  One tradition imagines states in the role of interest groups, primarily 
focusing on the way that multi-state associations represent a mixture of states, 
localities, and various officers of these governments in Washington D.C. (Herian 
2011; Arnold and Plant 1994; Cammisa 1995; Haider 1974; Pelissero and England 
1987).  This research is most interested in the communication between the 
associations and federal lawmakers and the influence that this communication may 
have on federal policy.  The other tradition imagines the states as policy laboratories 
from which the federal government can learn about policy innovations when crafting 
federal law (Esterling 2009; C. S. Weissert and Scheller 2008; Mossberger 1999; 
Thompson and Burke 2007).  This research is most interested in vertical policy 
diffusion and observes whether state policy experiments are replicated at the federal 
level. Both of these literatures rest primarily on studies of single policy areas or the 
behavior of a few public official associations.  This dissertation contributes to the 
field of intergovernmental relations and state policy diffusion by studying the 
interaction of state officials with members of Congress on a wide range of policies 
over a twelve-year time period between 1993 and 2004.  It also expands the 
perception of important intergovernmental actors by comparing individual state 






Federalism: A Structure Encouraging State Advocacy  
The structure and evolution of American federalism over time has given the states 
their dual identities as independent governments and lobbyists within an 
intergovernmental system. The power allocation between the states and the national 
government at the nation‘s founding is described as dual federalism. Power was 
divided so that each level of government would have sovereignty over its own 
jurisdiction (Peterson 1995; Grodzins 1966). An early description of the American 
federal arrangement portrayed it this way: 
The characteristic feature and special interest of the American Union is that it shows 
us two governments covering the same ground, yet distinct and separate in their 
action.  It is like a great factory wherein two sets of machinery are at work, their 
revolving wheels apparently intermixed, their bands crossing one another, yet each 
set doing its own work without touching or hampering the other (Lord James Bryce, 
as quoted in Wright 1978, 21). 
 
However, the power sharing relationship between the states and the national 
government is constitutionally vague due to a contradiction between the language of 
the Tenth Amendment and the Constitution‘s Necessary and Proper Clause. The 
Tenth Amendment states that ―powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, 
or to the people‖. However, the federal legislature is also entrusted with the 
responsibility to create laws for the general welfare and to ―make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper‖ to meet these ends. It is unclear which level of 




competition for power between the states and the national government (O‘Toole 
2007). 
According to Samuel Beer (1978), this competition between levels of 
government was intentionally created by the founders in order to levy the power 
struggle into a system of ―representational federalism‖. The intergovernmental design 
was intended to improve constituents‘ representation. The national government, the 
level of government furthest from the people, could be limited by the power of the 
state governments, a level of government more closely tied to the people. This 
distribution of power was predicated on the belief that the states did not give power to 
the nation and the nation did not give power to the states, but that the people created 
both and by their consent gave different powers to each. Beer‘s image of 
representational federalism directly contrasts with the ―compact theory‖ of 
federalism.  This is the belief that the nation‘s Constitution was ratified by state 
conventions, not the people themselves, so it was actually the states that gave power 
to the national government and they should be able to take it away if the national 
government oversteps its bounds. The rhetoric of these differing theories of 
federalism continues to appear in modern political debates over the proper function of 
each level of government.  
These theories of federal power are important for framing normative 
judgments regarding state government advocacy in the federal system.  If one accepts 
the compact theory of federalism then it would be natural to accept state government 
advocacy within the federal policy process because the legitimacy of federal policy is 




expectation that members of Congress should want to learn from state officials and be 
attentive to their policy interests and experiences.  The theory of representational 
federalism does not view the state governments as the origins of national political 
power, but only as a functional intermediary between the national government and the 
people.  Accepting this theory would not support an activist role for state 
governments in the federal policy process.  Federal attention should focus on the 
interests of the public rather than the state governments since it is the people who 
give power to the governments. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, presidents took responsibility for limiting 
the federal role in state government by vetoing laws that would have expanded the 
role of the national government into areas like public works construction and 
education. In 1822 President James Monroe vetoed a bill providing funds for a local 
road repair project saying,  
There were two separate and independent governments established over our Union, 
one for local purposes over each state by the people of the State, the other for 
national purposes over all the States by the people of the United States.  The whole 
power of the people, on the representative principle is divided between them.  The 
State governments are independent of each other, and to the extent of their powers 
are complete sovereignties (as quoted by Wisdom 1984, 1067–1068) .  
 
Despite the early American commitment to the values of dual federalism, many forms 
of intergovernmental cooperation developed including joint stock companies, land 
grants from the nation to the states, and shared personnel between levels of 
government. Passage of the Sixteenth Amendment gave the federal government an 
additional revenue source. The income tax provided the means for the national 
government to increase its policy influence over state governments through grants-in-




Supreme Court decisions in Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. 
Mellon in 1923 established that grants from the federal government to the sub-
governments did not violate state sovereignty because they are voluntary 
arrangements; any state can abstain from taking federal grant money if they wish to 
remain unfettered by the conditions of the grant. A multitude of categorical grants to 
states and localities battling the economic difficulties of the Great Depression ushered 
in the social welfare state and deepened the U.S. political system‘s intergovernmental 
complexity (Wright 1978).  V.O. Key (1956) documents this period in government 
development as a time when New Deal legislation and court decisions shifted policy 
power away from the states to the federal government. This happened at the same 
time that the impoverishment of local governments left them unable to administer 
policies they had handled in the past.  Even as the federal government reduced the 
states‘ policy roles, the states increased the size of their administration and 
government capacity to handle the implementation of federal programs. They were 
preparing to become intermediaries in the federal grant system where they would take 
on new roles in taxing and expenditures as well as distributing federal dollars to their 
local governments. During this time the states became ―governments that spend 
money they do not raise and raise money they do not spend‖ (Key 1956, 8). 
The New Deal era introduced greater intergovernmental complexity and 
President Lyndon Johnson‘s period of ―creative federalism‖ further increased federal 
grants to states and localities.  During this period, influence between the levels of 
government ran from the top-down and from the bottom-up as the federal government 




over their policies. The federal government attached restrictions to their grants to 
influence substantive policy content in the states and localities. As these grants 
became more essential for state and city governments to operate, mayors and 
governors found themselves spending local revenue to match federal grants and meet 
national priorities rather than on programs demanded by their constituents. State 
officials complained that the restrictions attached to federal grants were too stringent 
to be adapted to the needs of the localities, and that the attempt to do so was stripping 
localities of their independence. This complexity of competing needs and priorities 
defines the interdependence of governments in the United States.  
Grodzins‘ (1966) classic image of federalism after the New Deal was that the 
American system no longer resembled a ―layer cake,‖ with separate functions for 
each level of government, but rather a ―marble cake‖, with each level dependent on 
the others and in relentless negotiation for their interests within the branches of 
government in the nation and the states
1
. Elazar (1962; 1991) described this model of 
federalism as one in which there is little hierarchy and the federal government is a 
partner to the states rather than a level of government with more power than the states 
and localities.  He defined cooperative federalism as, ―a means for encouraging 
nationwide efforts to meet particular problems without national government 
dominance, and a means for using the federal government as a backstop for state 
                                                 
1
 A 1996 Senate hearing on legislation to enforce Tenth Amendment values featured a witness from the 
Tennessee Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations.  He referenced the various food 
metaphors crafted by academics to describe the federal system.  He volunteered that the current era 
should be categorized as the ―rancid nut cake period where no matter where you slice the cake, 
everybody is unhappy and dissatisfied with Federalism and what it has become, particular at the State 




efforts, rather than making the states administrative arms of a dominant Washington, 
D.C.‖ (p. 82). 
There are many who believe that Elazar‘s definition of federalism takes an 
unrealistic view of the real operations of the American system.  Competitive 
federalism has become its own branch of fiscal federal theory dealing with horizontal 
diffusion and competition among state governments for economic development (see 
Breton 1991 and Buchanan 1997), but some theorists recognize that competition 
between governments also takes place in the advocacy environment of the federal 
government. Kincaid (1991) describes state lobbying in the U.S. Congress as an 
example of ―mediated‖ intergovernmental competition.  This fulfills the goals of 
Lockian and Madisonian visions of democracy in which the states, like other interests 
in society, can compete for power against one another and the federal government.  
Some of this is competition over limited resources, like federal grants-in-aid, and 
some is competition over values that influence public policy.  The states have an 
interest in preventing the federal government from defining policy priorities in a way 
that stifles state priorities and the ability of the state government to craft diverse 
solutions to their problems. 
 
States as Lobbyists 
The growth of the interest group community and the explosion of lobbying in the 20
th
 
century has increased the impetus for states to take to Washington to defend their 
interests.  Studies of Washington lobby directories (Schlozman and Tierney 1986) 




interest groups had their greatest increases (by at least 40 percent) in the 1960s and 
1970s.  The growth in the number of groups leveled off in the mid-1990s but 
spending on lobbying has continued to increase (Berry and Wilcox 2009). The 
combination of the states‘ increased dependence on federal funds and the 
proliferation of professional lobbyists and well-organized interest groups inside the 
Beltway means that the states need to behave like other interest groups to compete for 
attention and support for their policy goals. Not only do the states want to receive 
federal money and want to avoid federal mandates, they also want to influence the 
structure and goals of federal programs to meet the needs of their jurisdictions. 
The academic research that views the state governments as lobbyists adopting 
many of the techniques of other interest groups has been most interested in the states‘ 
shared interest in increasing federal funding for state programs and reducing federal 
mandates and preemption. While the federal government has increased state 
discretion for some social welfare policies over the last 40 years, there continues to be 
a great deal of policy pressure from the top-down. The Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act (UMRA) of 1995 sought to alleviate the immense cost of federal policies to the 
states. However, a study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) documented 
that the practice of mandates continued and that, between 2001 and 2002, ―5 of 377 
statutes enacted and 9 of 122 major or economically significant final rules issued 
were identified as containing federal mandates at or above UMRA‘s thresholds‖ 
(―Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act Coverage‖ 2004, 4). The passage of 
this act did not end the federal government‘s policy pressure on the state governments 




This complicated intergovernmental dependence incentivizes the states to use their 
resources to influence federal policymaking.   
Salisbury (1984) characterized state governments as similar to other 
institutional interest groups, like universities and businesses, because they are 
managed, hierarchical and have lobbying goals independent of a voluntary 
membership. This study expands on his idea but also recognizes important differences 
between government institutions and non-governmental institutions in the interest 
group universe. While state governments may exhibit some of the same behaviors as 
other institutions when they lobby the federal government, state governments are 
political institutions as well as interest groups and thus have their own jurisdictions, 
powers, and constituents. They are not limited to traditional lobbying activities inside 
the Beltway because they have their own powers of policymaking and 
implamentation to symbolically or fundamentally attempt to influence federal policy. 
They also have representational relationships to the members of Congress. 
States and their State Congressional Delegations 
A number of scholars have explored the institutional features and norms that 
shape the relationship between the state governments and their congressional 
delegations.  While the original structure of representation called for the members of 
the House to be elected by the people and the members of the Senate to be appointed 
by the state legislatures, this changed with the passage of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913.  The decision to have the senators elected by the people of the 
state, rather than by the members of the state‘s legislature, severed the direct tie 




Posner 1998; Sbragia 2006).  This added to the erosion of the state governments‘ 
institutional leverage over their federal government that began when the state 
legislatures ceased to select the members of the Electoral College in the nineteenth 
century (Dinan 1997).   
While these changes did away with the institutional connections between the 
state and federal governments, there were still aspects of the political system which 
gave the state governments a great deal of power in Washington.  Well into the 
twentieth century, the political party system in the United States was decentralized so 
that state and local officials influenced the policy goals of national lawmakers 
through the local control of the parties (Grodzins 1966).  However, the rise of split-
ticket voting reduced the frequency that a state‘s governor was a member of the same 
party as the state‘s two senators, and this prevented him from influencing them 
through the state parties.  Furthermore, the implementation of the direct primary 
system once again increased the power of the state‘s voters at the expense of the 
leverage that state officials could exercise over their congressional delegation (Haider 
1974; Posner 1998). 
While previously the state and local government officials had played an 
important role in the party nomination process, the direct primary removed them from 
the position of king-makers and severed another tie between the state government and 
the state‘s representatives to the U.S. Congress.  This change to the political system 
provoked an important development in intergovernmental relations.  It was around the 
time that these changes to the political process occurred that the intergovernmental 




Association (at that time, called the National Governors Conference) began to take a 
more intentional role in representing state government officials in Washington by 
publishing policy statements and opening offices of state-federal relations in the 
capital (Haider 1974). 
Policy Considerations Differ by Level of Government 
In addition to the evolution of intergovernmental relationships, there are other 
structural government arrangements that reduce the power of the state governments in 
the federal policy process.  The national government institutions are organized 
functionally, by policy topics such as agriculture and banking, while representation is 
organized territorially, dividing the geography of the country into different states and 
districts (Sbragia 2006).  The residents of states are represented nationally by their 
congressional delegation, and these members sit on committees that handle policy in 
particular functional categories.  The structure of the government further influences 
divisions between the territorial interests of the states and the functional focus of 
national lawmakers.  When making national policy, members of Congress are most 
likely to focus on the policy outcomes in a functional area, while state government 
officials will have an interest in both the outcomes of policy and the location of 
authority for implementing and funding that policy (Derthick 2001; Sbragia 2006).  
States are looking out for their institutional self-interest with the goal of maintaining 
as much authority over the governing of their territory as possible, while national 
lawmakers are concerned with meeting functional policy goals based on partisan, 




Theoretically, the division between the interests of a state government and the 
interests of the state‘s congressional delegation should not be vast.  After all, the 
state‘s governor and its senators are elected by voters from the same geographic 
region, so the electoral connection should impose similar pressures on each.  
However, the reality of election cycles and term lengths results in governors and 
senators spending different lengths of time in office and often coming up for election 
in different years.   Thus, the nature of a given election year will bring different voters 
to the polls.  Furthermore, the candidates‘ experiences with different challengers and 
campaign themes will impose different issue politics on the policy goals of each of 
these officials (Sulkin 2005).  These political forces are so potent that even senators 
from the same state and political party often face very different pressures because 
they appeal to different constituencies in their policy focus and rely on different 
individuals and groups to make up their fundraising base (Schiller 2000).  
Constituency is not limited to geography and party, it involves many circles of 
political supporters within the geographic lines of the district (in this case, the state) 
which can result in two politicians elected from the same geography with very 
different policy goals (Fenno 1978).   
 
States as Laboratories 
Justice Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court was the first of many to describe the 
states as ―laboratories of democracy‖ because of their ability to experiment with 
policy and test out different ways to solve societal problems.  This metaphor has 




to a lesser degree, from the states to the federal government (Walker 1969; Gray 
1973; Shipan and Volden 2006, 2008; Volden 2006; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 
2008; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Karch 2007, 2010; Lowery, Gray, and 
Baumgartner 2011).  Of interest in this study is the idea that state policy innovations 
can diffuse to the federal government because of congressional interest in learning 
from state policy experiences.  This is predicated on the idea that the states have their 
own elected officials and bureaucrats to develop and implement policies which means 
they can provide expert advice and testimony to the federal government from 
members of their state governments (Grady 2004).  Since the 1980s the states have 
been expected to be especially well-situated to act as policy laboratories.  From the 
1970s, during Nixon‘s New Federalism, through the tenure of Reagan and Gingrich, 
more policy responsibility was devolved to the states (Karch 2007).  With this new 
authority the state governments developed expertise in such areas as economic 
growth, infrastructure development, housing, education, and welfare in order to meet 
the modern challenges of governing (Morehouse and Jewell 2004).  At the same time 
many of the state governments increased their institutional capacity, improving the 
pay and staff resources of their state legislatures which allowed for more research and 
policy evaluation in the state legislative process (Kousser 2005; Bowman and 
Kearney 2010; Squire 2007, 1992). 
Most of the research on state policy innovations has focused on how states 
learn from one another and diffuse policy among the states.  However, a small 
number of studies have considered federal learning from state policy innovations 




Weissert and Scheller 2008; Thompson and Burke 2007; Boeckelman 1992).  They 
tend to see federal learning from state policy as an extension of the theory of interest 
group activity as a legislative subsidy where interest groups provide information and 
assistance that reduces the workload of those legislators who support their positions 
(Hall and Deardorff 2006).  In the case of the states, their policy experiences would 
provide models for federal lawmakers interested in learning about successful policy 
innovations from the states.   
 Unlike the literature on intergovernmental lobbying that tends to see 
disconnect between the interests of state governments and those of the state‘s 
congressional delegation, the research tradition on vertical policy diffusion sees 
connections between these levels of government.  Many members of Congress come 
from careers in state government and those experiences should increase their interest 
in state policy innovations and allow policy ideas to travel from the state to the 
federal government (Berkman 1993; 1994).  The congressional committee system 
may support this learning since one of the motivating factors for members of 
Congress seeking committee assignments is the importance of the committee‘s policy 
jurisdiction to the constituents they represent (Deering and Smith 1997).  Since state 
governments have been found to be quite responsive to the policy preferences of their 
residents (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1994), their policy experiments could be quite 
informative to members of Congress.  This is especially the case since members are 
particularly interested in understanding how their policy choices will impact their 
political prospects (Burstein and Hirsh 2007), and they can see those political 




Overview of the Study 
The research tradition conceptualizing the states as intergovernmental lobbyists and 
the tradition that considers the states to be policy laboratories are not mutually 
exclusive.  However, no study has made an effort to consider these models of 
intergovernmental relations side-by-side in an effort to understand the role that states 
play in federal policymaking. The chapters that follow focus on several important 
questions about the role of the state governments in the federal system.  The study 
utilizes an original dataset of congressional hearings held between 1993 and 2004 (the 
103
rd
 to the 108
th
 Congress) in which a state government official or a representative 
of a public official association testified.  These cases are matched to the hearing 
database collected by the Policy Agenda Project in order to categorize the hearings by 
standardized policy codes.  Chapter 2 addresses the difference between advocacy by 
public official associations and advocacy by individual states in congressional 
policymaking.  Prior studies of intergovernmental relations have focused on the 
lobbying activities of multi-state associations.  However, there are theoretical reasons 
to expect that state governments will actively advocate for their policy interests apart 
from the public official associations that represent them.  This chapter compares the 
participation of associations and individual states across a range of policy areas and 
concludes that the behavior of the associations is not representative of the entire 
intergovernmental lobby.  The individual states and the associations are active in 





 Chapter 3 focuses on the frequency of state officials‘ appearances in 
congressional hearings and analyses a quantitative model explaining the variation in 
the number of witnesses testifying from each state government.  This chapter tests 
two explanations for state government participation in committee hearings.  The first 
is that states will be more likely to testify in committees in which there are members 
from their state‘s congressional delegation, especially if those members are in 
positions of leadership on the committee.  The second is that the states with the 
resources and institutions necessary to craft innovative public policy will be those 
most likely to testify in congressional hearings.  The models demonstrate more 
reliable support for an explanation involving the state‘s congressional delegation.  
The traditional measures of a state‘s capacity to craft innovative policy are not 
consistently related to a state‘s appearances in congressional hearings. 
 The conclusions from chapter 3 indicate that the states may not be used for 
purposes of learning about state policy innovations when state officials testify in 
congressional hearings.  In order to understand what it is that members of Congress 
want to learn from the states I engage in close reading and analysis of a sample of 
hearings.  The stated goals of the committee leadership and committee members, the 
testimony of the witnesses, and the interaction between the committee members and 
witnesses develops a more nuanced picture of intergovernmental advocacy and policy 
learning.  Members of Congress do express an interest in state policy experiences and 
state official‘s expertise in policy development and implementation.  Their interaction 
does not necessarily represent an attempt to learn from the most innovative state 




complex and involves cooperative relationships between all levels of government.  
Officials in the states and the federal government depend upon one another to 
develop, fund, and implement policy and evaluate whether policies are meeting their 
goals. When state governments participate in congressional hearings they are 
engaging in the power struggle that theorists believe is necessary to preserve a robust 
federation (Bednar 2009; Nugent 2009).  
 Chapter 5 concludes the study with a reflection on the findings and their 
implications for policymaking in a federal system.  The results reinforce the dual 
roles legislators play as representatives of a geographic constituency as well as 
national policymakers.  Members of Congress are interested in learning about policy 
experiences in the states but their interactions with state officials in congressional 
hearings do not prioritize learning about the most innovative state policies.  They do 
give state officials the opportunity to advocate for their interests, both in the details of 





















Chapter 2: States and Public Official Associations 
 
“But ambitious encroachments of the federal government on the authority of the state 
governments would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only.  
They would be signals of general alarm.  Every government would espouse the 
common cause.  A correspondence would be opened.  Plans of resistance would be 
concerted.  One spirit would animate and conduct the whole.”  James Madison, 
Federalist 46 
 
James Madison envisioned a union of states in which opposition to federal action that 
encroached on state power would be uniformly adopted by all of the state 
governments.  He believed that this would be a key safeguard balancing state powers 
against federal encroachment, along with constitutional safeguards such as the state 
legislatures‘ roles in appointing presidential electors and choosing the state‘s 
representatives in the U.S. Senate.  These particular constitutional safeguards were 
eliminated, severing the direct tie between the state‘s government and its 
representatives in Congress (Dinan 1997; Posner 1998; Sbragia 2006), though some 
scholars doubt that the Senate acted in the interests of the states‘ governments (as 
opposed to the state‘s electorate) even when its members were selected by the state 
legislatures (Riker 1955).  Institutional safeguards of the state-federal relationship are 
an essential structure for preventing abuses of the American system of federalism 
(Bednar 2009).  As these other institutional safeguards of state power have weakened, 
the ability of the states to advocate for their interests in the federal policy process has 
become more important. This became increasingly institutionalized during the latter 
half of the 20
th
 century with the rise of organized public official associations 




Most research on the advocacy activities of the states has assumed, like 
Madison, that the states‘ governments work together to influence federal action.  
Scholars have focused, nearly exclusively, on lobbying by public official associations 
when they study the influence of state governments on federal policy.  Public official 
associations (POAs) are made up of members who are themselves members of 
governments (see Arnold and Plant 1994 for an overview of their history).  These 
include prominent associations like the National Governors Association (NGA), made 
up of the governors of the 50 states, and associations of state bureaucrats like the 
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 
made up of personnel from the states‘ departments of transportation.  Public official‘s 
associations may be national in scope, with members from all 50 states (often 
including the District of Columbia and the U.S. territories), or they can be regional or 
policy-specific, such as the Coalition of Northeastern Governors and the Interstate Oil 
and Gas Compact Commission.  While these organizations are clearly influential 
players in intergovernmental advocacy, this paper considers what might have been 
missed by studying state lobbying through the actions of associations rather than 
individual states.   
Using a new dataset of witness testimony in congressional hearings, this 
chapter will demonstrate that advocacy by individual states, acting alone, is far more 
common than advocacy by public official associations.  It will also reveal that states 
and associations are commonly involved in advocating on policy within different 




understanding of when and why states lobby alone and when they lobby Congress 
through public official associations.       
 
State Witnesses in Congressional Hearings 
In recent years, a number of scholars have begun to expand our understanding of 
contemporary federalism by focusing on the state governments as intergovernmental 
lobbyists.  The academic literature has measured state lobbying in many ways: as the 
policy positions of public official associations, especially the National Governors 
Association and National Conference of State Legislatures (Cammisa 1995; Haider 
1974; Herian 2011; Nugent 2009); the state‘s memorials to Congress articulating 
policy preferences (Leckrone and Gollob 2010); state governors‘ state-of-the-state 
addresses (Nugent 2009); and the presence of state offices in Washington D.C. 
(Jensen and Emery 2011; Jensen 2010; Nugent 2009; Pelissero and England 1987). 
 This chapter presents a new way to study the states‘ involvement in 
intergovernmental lobbying using a new database of all appearances of state 
government officials and public official associations as witnesses in congressional 
committee hearings between 1993 to 2004 (the 103rd to the 108th Congresses).  
The use of congressional hearing testimony provides a valuable new 
perspective on intergovernmental lobbying.  First, it expands the scope of 
intergovernmental advocates being studied.  The research that has focused on 
lobbying and the policy positions of the NGA and NCSL is limited by the consensus 
nature of these organizations.  NCSL policy positions need the support of at least 




least two-thirds of governors at the plenary sessions to adopt a policy position 
(Nugent 2009).  Haider explains that while these two prominent public official 
association have a great deal of legitimacy and access to federal lawmakers, they also 
tend to avoid controversial issues when they cannot reach an agreement and they may 
have less influence than other interest groups on broad federal policies.   
The NGA, which is the most closely studied of all public official associations, 
may also face more difficulty coming to consensus on policy positions than other 
intergovernmental lobbies because of the prominence of the membership and the 
tendency of the governors to behave like ―fifty prima donnas‖ (Haider 1974, 24). 
 Schneier and Gross assert that the conflicts within the governmental associations are 
severe and, ―organizations like the Governors‘ Conference are so torn by partisanship 
that they seldom take positions on controversial issues‖ (1993, 26).  Individual states, 
however, should not be hampered by such divisions and, if a governor wishes to 
advocate on behalf of his or her state government‘s interests and policy preferences, 
however controversial, then there should be little to prevent this.  Dinan (2011) 
demonstrates that this was the case during creation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010.  Partisan polarization made it so that the NGA and 
NCSL were severely constrained by the divisions between their members.  Members 
of the NGA were able to agree that insurance exchanges should be operated at the 
state rather than the federal level and they could agree on the general principal of 
opposing any unfunded mandates on the state governments.  However, internal 
divisions meant that the NGA could not take a position on important policy details of 




governments, like the expansion of the Medicaid program.  Dinan concluded that the 
non-partisan public official associations were overshadowed by the lobbying 
activities of the individual state governments during debate over the content of this 
legislation.  
In 2012, Governor LaPage of Maine announced that he would only attend the 
winter meeting of the NGA because it would allow him to interact with President 
Obama and members of the Cabinet but he would no longer attend any policy 
meetings of the organization.  The Bangor Daily News quoted him saying, ―I get no 
value out of those meetings.  They are too politically correct and everybody is lovey-
dovey and no decisions are ever made.  There are some tough decisions that need to 
be made in this country and we need to start making them‖ (Leary 2012). This 
sentiment is consistent with studies of the lobbying behavior of institutional interest 
groups that also have the choice to lobby individually or in coalitions through 
umbrella or trade associations.  Lowery and Gray (1998) find that trade associations 
focus on less controversial, broader issues than do the individual institutions that 
make up their membership. This indicates that the picture of state government 
advocacy in the federal policy process is not likely to be complete when we focus 
only on the interests of the POAs. 
Furthermore, most studies of intergovernmental associations have focused on 
case studies of the organizations‘ advocacy activities on a specific policy issue or 
during a very limited time period (Cammisa 1995; Dinan 1997; Dinan 2011; Haider 
1974; Herian 2011).  Very few have attempted to collect time-series data on 




Gollob 2010 for a database of state memorials to Congress and Jensen 2010 for 
governors‘ lobbying offices in D.C.).  Some scholars have begun to use state and 
POA testimony in congressional committee hearings to understand how congress 
members learn about the states‘ perspectives on federal policy and their experiences 
in policy implementation and innovation within their own jurisdiction (Dinan 1997; 
Dinan 2011; Esterling 2009). But these studies focus only on health policy hearings. 
The study of advocacy by state governments and state public official 
associations in congressional hearings provides a rich data source for analysis of 
intergovernmental advocacy across all policy areas over a substantial length of time.  
It provides a forum for studying the trends in the policy focus of advocacy as well as 
the relationships between the witnesses from state governments and the members of 
Congress representing those states.  The collection of data from these hearings 
provides a source for empirical analysis while the text of these hearings provides a 
wealth of qualitative detail for understanding the relationships, strategies, and 
attitudes of intergovernmental advocates and the congressional members they lobby.  
While recent scholarship has discussed the methodological flaws inherent in 
measuring state policy preferences by using only the positions of the public official 
associations (Leckrone and Gollob 2010) there has not yet been a study that compares 
the positions of the states to those of the associations to establish whether there is, in 
fact, a difference in their preferences or policy focus.   
Policy Learning Through Witness Testimony 
Testimony from state government and public official association witnesses in 




perspective of vertical policy diffusion.  This testimony represents the information 
that members of the federal legislature hope to learn from the state governments.  In 
the House and the Senate, witnesses must be invited by the committee chair, usually 
after careful selection and sometimes vetting by committee staff as well as 
negotiation between the majority and minority staff of the committee (Sachs and 
Vincent 1999; Sachs 2004). Thus, the witnesses‘ testimony is intended to highlight 
the perspectives and debates that the members of the committee should consider when 
pursuing the committee‘s policy agenda.  The chair has significant power to drive the 
agenda of the committee, though Senate committee chairs have greater independence 
than those in the House, who are often constrained by the agenda of the House 
majority party leadership (Cox and McCubbins 2005).  
While the chair and the committee staff from the majority party make most of 
the decisions regarding hearing topics and witness invitations, both House and Senate 
rules provide the ranking minority member and minority staff the opportunity to 
select witnesses representing minority viewpoints (Sachs and Vincent 1999; Sachs 
2004).  While intergovernmental witnesses are certainly engaging in lobbying activity 
by testifying in a hearing, they are constrained by the committee‘s agenda and cannot 
advocate for any issue on their own agenda.  Thus, committee testimony should be 
seen as a measure of vertical policy learning as driven by the congressional policy 
agenda and the chair‘s preferences.  The content of the testimony may be the 
prerogative of the witness and represent the priorities of their government, or 
member-governments, but the topic of the hearing is set by the committee chair and 






The data set contains information for 4692 witnesses testifying on behalf of state 
governments or state public official associations in congressional committee hearings 
during the 103-108th Congresses (1993-2004).  The transcripts of hearings are 
archived by the Congressional Information Service (CIS) and the proprietary 
program, ProQuest Congressional, makes these transcripts available for text-
searching online.  The witnesses were identified through a keyword search of the 
hearing abstracts, which describe the subjects of the hearing and provide a list of 
witnesses and their titles and affiliations, for state names and the names of common 
titles and offices in state governments.  Every witness who appeared in the search 
results was examined to determine whether the person was a current state government 
official testifying on behalf of their state government. If the person was identified as a 
state government official but was testifying on behalf of a public official association 
then they were distinguished from those witnesses that represent only the state 
government. 
Most public official associations are made up of volunteer members from the 
state governments who maintain the organization, conduct policy research, and adopt 
policy positions with the help of a very small professional support staff in the 
organization (Arnold and Plant 1994).  When these organizations send a witness to 
testify in a congressional committee hearing the witness is almost exclusively one of 
their members who is also an official in a state government.  Thus, these witnesses 




hearing archives for each public official association by name. The notable exceptions 
are the National Governors Association and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, both of which have large professional staff organizations as well as 
policy analysts producing reports and supporting the advocacy and education goals of 
these associations.  These two associations are often represented in congressional 
testimony by an executive director or policy expert who is not also an official from a 
state government and would not be identified by the search procedure described 
above.  Because of the prominence of these two organizations and the need for their 
advocacy activities to be fully represented in the database, a separate search was used 
to identify witnesses from the NGA and the NCSL who were not also officials from 
the state governments. 
In order to expand the scope of the data and make additional analysis possible, 
the new database of state witnesses from the CIS archives was appended to the 
Congressional Hearings database from the Policy Agendas Project
2
 using a process 
described by Rabinowitz and Laugesen (2010).  The Policy Agendas Project database 
also utilizes the hearing documents in the CIS archives to collect standardized, long-
term data on congressional hearings.  Each hearing is assigned a subject-matter code 
consisting of 19 major policy topics to identify the primary issue discussed in every 
hearing. The hearings are also assigned standard committee codes to identify the 
committee(s) and subcommittee(s) hosting the hearing.  This allows researchers to 
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 The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the 
support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were 
distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF 




compare committees over time, even as these bodies change their names (Hunt et al. 
2010). 
The unit of analysis in the Policy Agendas Project database is the 
congressional hearing while in the new database created by the author the unit of 
analysis is the witness testifying in the hearing.  If more than one witness from a state 
government or state association testified in a single hearing then the information for 
that hearing is repeated for each individual witness.  The Policy Agendas Project 
database of all hearings provides a source for determining general trends in 
congressional hearings where any type of witness participated.  This is a valuable 
point of comparison for the new database consisting of only state witnesses.  Not only 
is comparison possible between trends in the testimony of state and association 
witnesses, but it is also possible to compare these trends to the overall focus of the 




 Congresses.   
These data provide the means for answering several questions.  Is it 
appropriate to infer the issue preferences of individual state governments from the 
advocacy activities of public official associations?  In what ways do the advocacy 
agendas of witnesses from individual states differ from the agenda of public official 
associations?  How closely do the states and the associations mirror the overall policy 
focus of Congress?  And finally, can the text of the hearing testimony provide insight 
into when and why states might testify individually instead of having their positions 






State Government and State Association Advocacy 
  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the general trends of state government testimony in 
congressional committee hearings.  The overall drop in the number of witnesses is 
expected given the drop in the number of congressional hearings over time.  In the 
103
rd
 session, at the beginning of the time period in this study, the House conducted 
4,304 committee hearings and the Senate conducted 2,043 hearings.  By the 108
th
 
session those numbers had dropped to 2,135 hearings in the House and 1,506 in the 
Senate (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2008).  Over the twelve-year period, 78 percent 
of witnesses in the database testified on behalf of an individual state government.    
 Figure 2.1. Frequency of witness testimony in number of appearances per year 
 Twenty-two percent of these witnesses testified on behalf of a public official 




of all public official associations, the National Conference of State Legislatures and 
the National Governors Association, two percent of the witnesses represented the 
NCSL and three percent represented the NGA during this time period.  Witnesses for 
the NGA and the NCSL include witnesses from the state governments testifying on 
behalf of these associations and also witnesses from the staff of the associations who 
are not affiliated with an individual state. 
In addition to differences in the frequency of witness testimony across these 
groups, the state government witnesses and the association witnesses focused on 
different substantive policy topics in their testimony.  Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
distribution of the individual state witnesses and witnesses from the state associations 
across the 19 policy areas identified by the Policy Agendas Project. Witnesses who 
were representing individual state governments testified most frequently on the topic 
of public lands and water management (14 percent of state witness testimony).  In 
comparison, this was a policy topic that state association witnesses testified on 
relatively infrequently.  Environmental policy was popular for both individual state 
witnesses and public official associations.  This issue area was the focus of 14 percent 
of the witnesses from both the associations and the individual states, making it the 
most frequently lobbied issue for the associations and the second most frequent for 
the states.   
 Other noticeable policy differences were the associations‘ frequent advocacy 
in hearings focusing on banking, finance, and domestic commerce (13 percent of 
association witness testimony) while individual states were far less active in this area.  




operations, defined by the Policy Agendas Project as policies involving such issues as 
budget and appropriations, intergovernmental relations, oversight, management of 
government agencies and employees, as well as nominations and appointments.  This 
policy made up 12 percent of the witness testimony of public official associations, but 
only five percent of individual state governments.  The individual state governments 
were more frequent witnesses on policies involving law, crime and family issues than 
were the witnesses for public official associations.  The states were also more  
 









frequently active in their advocacy on education policy than were POA witnesses.  
Witnesses from the states and the public official associations dedicated a similar 
proportion of their activity to testifying in hearings concerning health policy. 
Government Operations 
The associations spent a greater proportion of their committee participation on 
issues categorized as government operations, but this is a broad issue area and should 
be studied further to understand the policies on which the states and associations were 
advocates.  Most of the POA witness testimony occurred in hearings falling into the 
subcategory of general budget requests and appropriations for multiple departments 
and agencies.  Associations also frequently sent  witnesses to testify on issues of 
intergovernmental relations, including policies concerning federal grants to the states 
and state government finances. 
Though the individual state government officials spent a smaller proportion of 
their overall congressional activity testifying in government operations hearings, they 
were also frequent witnesses on the above mentioned issues.  They were also often 
active on other subcategories of government operations such as government 
efficiency and oversight hearings, and issues in campaigns and elections.  These are 
areas in which Congress members would have reason to seek testimony from 
individual states.  Oversight hearings often involve testimony from individual state 
governments discussing their implementation of federal policy.  Election policy is an 
area over which the individual states have significant power.  This was especially 
evident during the time period of this study when the presidential election of 2000 




Vote Act in 2002, which involved a great deal of individual state input (Palazzolo and 
Ceaser 2005).  
Public Lands and Water Management 
A greater proportion of state government witnesses testified on the issue of 
public lands and water management than did witnesses from the POAs.  In raw 
numbers, the differences were even starker.  Over the twelve-year period of the study, 
498 witnesses from individual states testified on this issue compared to only 67 
witnesses from the public official associations.  In looking at the subcategories of this 
issue area, very few witnesses from either the states or the associations testified on 
issues related to U.S. dependencies and territorial issues.  The issue of national parks, 
memorials, historic sites, and recreation also saw little testimony from the states or 
the associations.  Most of the witnesses from the individual state governments 
testified on three subcategories of this major issue area: Native American affairs; 
natural resources, public lands, and forest management; and water resources 
development and research.  
 It seems likely that the predominance of individual state witnesses on issues of 
public lands and water management can be explained by Nugent‘s (2009) framework 
for intergovernmental lobbying.  He created a typology to explain the interests of the 
intergovernmental lobby that can be broken into ―universal‖ interests, ―categorical‖ 
interests, and ―particularistic‖ interests based on whether the issue is able to unite all 
states, a small group of states, or only one or a few states.  He expected that the 
associations would see consensus among their membership and have the most policy 




divide the members and result in individual states or small coalitions lobbying on 
their own.  The issues of public lands and water, which are tied to geography and 
often pit one state‘s interests against another, would be labeled as particularistic. The 
issue area of government operations, discussed above, involves more general issues 
of intergovernmental relations – which frequently include resistance to federal 
unfunded mandates or federal encroachment on state power – and these issues have a 
universal appeal and become important aspects of the public official associations‘ 
agendas.     
 
Niche Interests? Comparing State and POA Advocacy to the Policy Agenda 
 
While it is useful to understand the differences between trends in the testimony of 
state governments and public official associations, it is also necessary to compare the 
testimony of both of these groups to the larger policy agenda in Congress.  The public 
agenda is limited and one of the primary challenges for lobbyists from any institution 
or organization is simply to grab the attention of lawmakers and get others to care 
about their issue (F. Baumgartner et al. 2009).  There is reason to expect that 
witnesses from the intergovernmental lobby may be privileged among the interest 
group community.  Baumgartner and Leech (2001) used federal lobbying disclosure 
reports to study the crowding of interest groups around particular policies.  They 
found that the intergovernmental lobby, like the business lobby, more frequently 
advocates on issues with few competing organizations.  Thus, they often occupy their 
own policy niches where they may have greater influence on policy because the issue 




To evaluate interest niches, Baumgartner and Leech looked at the total 
number of interest groups involved in each policy area.  This chapter will consider the 
number of hearings in each policy area and the proportion of those hearings involving 
witnesses from the intergovernmental lobby.  To do this, I aggregate the data from the 
unit of the witness to the unit of the hearing so I can compare the policy focus of 
hearings containing at least one witness from the intergovernmental lobby
3
 to the 





Comparing the policy focus of all congressional hearings during this time period to 
the policy activism of witnesses for the states and associations provides insight into 
the relevance of these groups.  Are they primarily involved on niche issues that were 
not widely considered in Congress or are they players on the major issues of the day?   
 The most frequent topic of congressional hearings during this time period was 
government operations (at 14 percent of all hearings), followed by international 
affairs (11 percent) and foreign aid, public lands and water management, banking and 
finance, and health (all at eight percent).  Table 2.1 shows the concentration of 
hearings in each issue area and the percent of hearings in each issue with at least one 
witness from a public official association or a state government.  This table makes it 
obvious that, while government operations was a dominant issue for the 
intergovernmental lobby – especially association witnesses, these witnesses only 
participated in a small number of the total congressional hearings on this topic.  Three 
percent of hearings on government operations heard from a witness from the POAs 
and 5 percent had a witness from a state government.  This is clearly a policy area 
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Leech (2001) because I only include state officials or public official associations representing state 




where many interests are represented and the interests of the state governments make 
up only a small portion of the whole.  
The intergovernmental lobby was better represented on two of the other major 
issues from the congressional hearing agenda.  In health policy hearings, 16 percent 
heard from a state government witness and five percent had a witness from a POA.  
In the area of banking and finance, 12 percent of the hearings heard from a state 
witness and seven percent had a POA witness.  Of the top-five issues that dominated 
the congressional agenda, public lands and water management heard the most 
testimony from the individual state governments.  In 20 percent of hearings on this 
topic there was at least one witness from a state government.  Though this is an issue 
with many hearings and many interests being represented, the state governments very 
frequently had the opportunity to voice their perspectives in hearings. 
Among some of the issues that were not key aspects of the congressional 
agenda during this period, the states and the public official associations have 
established policy niches.  The environment was the topic of only 5 percent of all 
congressional hearings but nearly a third of these hearings had a witness from a state 
government and 10 percent heard testimony from a POA witness.  Similarly, the issue 
of education made up only three percent of congressional hearings but 27 percent of 
these invited testimony from a state government witness.  These are not the most 
common issues on the congressional agenda, but when they are addressed, the 




















Macroeconomics 549 17 3% 37 7% 
Health 1462 77 5% 231 16% 
Agriculture 519 27 5% 70 13% 
Education 506 29 6% 137 27% 
Environment 897 92 10% 275 31% 
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and 
Civil Liberties 315 7 2% 34 11% 
Labor, Employment, and Immigration 683 22 3% 80 12% 
Energy 585 57 10% 113 19% 
Transportation 762 60 8% 138 18% 
Law, Crime, and Family Issues 1055 44 4% 196 19% 
Social Welfare 380 25 7% 96 25% 
Community Development and 
Housing Issues 304 20 7% 40 13% 
Banking, Finance, and Domestic 
Commerce 1504 110 7% 178 12% 
Government Operations 2403 76 3% 118 5% 
Public Lands and Water Management 1443 62 4% 287 20% 
Space, Science, Technology and 
Communications 876 23 3% 55 6% 
Defense 1205 11 1% 43 4% 
Foreign Trade 437 3 1% 21 5% 
International Affairs and Foreign Aid 1895 2 0% 23 1% 







These comparisons illustrate that the state governments and the public official 
associations have issue niches where they focus their advocacy.  Overall, these trends 
are consistent with prior research that considered the policy focus of state legislative 
memorials to Congress as another means of communicating the states‘ policy 
preferences (Leckrone and Gollob 2010).  They identified health, environment, 
transportation, and public lands/water management as the policy areas on which the 
states most frequently sent memorials to Congress.  The major difference between 
trends in legislative memorials and trends in state witness testimony is that the most 
frequent topic of legislative memorials was the issue of defense, while state 
government witnesses were rarely called to testify on defense policy in congressional 
hearings. 
Concentration of Witnesses from the Intergovernmental Lobby 
In order to evaluate the potential policy impact of congressional testimony 
from the intergovernmental lobby it is helpful to know whether that testimony is 
usually coming from one source or whether committee members are hearing from 
multiple witnesses representing intergovernmental interests.  Knowing the average 
number of witnesses testifying in a hearing can help us to understand when members 
of Congress were more likely to hear from multiple witnesses, and possibly 
conflicting testimony, from the intergovernmental lobby.   
The majority of hearings in which a member of the intergovernmental lobby 
testified involved only one witness from a state government or public official 
association (68 percent). In most cases, when a state government official or 




representing the interests of state governments in the hearing.  Only eight percent of 
the hearings had more than two witnesses from the intergovernmental lobby testifying 
in the same hearing.  Of these, a very small number of large, multi-day hearings 
involved 10 or more witnesses with a state or POA affiliation (11 such hearings were 
held between 1993 and 2004).  On average there were 1.74 witnesses from the 
intergovernmental lobby in each hearing in the dataset.  The average for public 
official association witnesses was .38 witnesses in each hearing and the average for 
individual state governments was 1.36 witnesses in each hearing. 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the concentration of witnesses representing state 
government interests within each policy area.  On average, more than two witnesses 
from the intergovernmental lobby testified on issues of energy and on transportation.  
The policy areas of macroeconomics, the environment and government operations 
came close to an average of two witnesses from states or associations in each hearing.  
In these policy areas, the committees were more likely to hear from multiple 
witnesses representing state interests.  As expected, the policy areas related to defense 
and foreign affairs had a small concentration of intergovernmental witnesses in their 
hearings.  Of the domestic issue areas, civil rights, minority issues, and civil liberties 
had a very small average number of intergovernmental witnesses, as did banking, 
finance and domestic commerce.  Banking and commerce is especially notable 
because it is a policy area in which there was frequent participation by state and POA 
witnesses but their lack of concentration indicates that these witnesses were spread 
across many hearings.  This may indicate that there was more consensus among the 





Table 2.2 Hearings with at Least One Witness from the Intergovernmental Lobby 
   











Macroeconomics 47 91 1.40 0.53 1.94 
Health 284 445 1.18 0.39 1.57 
Agriculture 91 154 1.35 0.34 1.69 
Education 152 240 1.36 0.22 1.58 
Environment 321 634 1.54 0.44 1.98 
Civil Rights, 
Minority Issues, and 
Civil Liberties 40 54 1.15 0.20 1.35 
Labor, Employment, 
and Immigration 
93 165 1.46 0.31 1.77 
Energy 150 304 1.59 0.43 2.03 
Transportation 166 383 1.74 0.57 2.31 
Law, Crime, and 
Family Issues 223 376 1.44 0.24 1.69 
Social Welfare 108 202 1.52 0.35 1.87 
Community 
Development and 
Housing Issues 57 84 1.04 0.44 1.47 
Banking, Finance, 
and Domestic 
Commerce 259 373 0.93 0.51 1.44 
Government 
Operations 162 318 1.21 0.77 1.98 
Public Lands and 
Water Management 328 565 1.52 0.20 1.72 
Space, Science, 
Technology and 
Communications 72 106 1.11 0.36 1.47 
Defense 51 75 1.25 0.22 1.47 
Foreign Trade 23 30 1.17 0.13 1.30 
International Affairs 
and Foreign Aid 24 34 1.33 0.08 1.42 





one witness representing the policy goals of all the states.  As illustrated in figure 2.2, 
this was a policy area in which a large percentage of the public official association 
witnesses testified.  If there was agreement among the state governments in this issue 
area then the associations would have the authority to speak on behalf of unified state 
government interests.   
 
Observations from Hearing Testimony 
The data from witness testimony in congressional hearings provide a wealth of new 
information about the state governments as actors in the federal policy process, but 
the text of these hearings are also a rich source from which to make observations 
about the behavior of the intergovernmental lobby.  Beyond the policy trends in the 
testimony from state witnesses and the differences in the patterns of state government 
testimony and the testimony from public official associations, the question remains: 
why would a state government witness testify in a hearing instead of having their 
views represented by a public official association?  Conversely, when will the 
associations be most likely to represent the state governments without any opposition 
from their members?   
Prior studies have observed that partisan and ideological divisions between the 
state governments and, consequently, the members of public official associations, can 
lead to a lack of consensus on issues and failure for the association to become active 
on a particular policy (Cammisa 1995; see also Derthick 2001 for a theoretical 
explanation of this behavior).  However, observations from the testimony and 




far from the only reason that the public official associations would not represent the 
state governments‘ interests.  And partisan agreement is not the only reason that 
associations would speak unopposed on behalf of the states.   
Lowery and Gray (1998) explore Salisbury‘s (1984) assertion of the 
dominance of institutions in the interest group community and their theories provide a 
framework for understanding state and public official association advocacy.  They 
conceive of institutional interests groups as businesses or organizations that can lobby 
individually or together in the form of trade associations.  They test multiple theories 
for why the institutions lobby on their own and why they form larger umbrella 
associations to represent the group‘s interests.  These theories are equally useful to 
explain when states choose to lobby individually and when they lobby through public 
official associations. 
Three explanations for patterns in intergovernmental lobbying are described 
here.  The first is what Lowery and Gray call ―signaling theory‖, which suggests that 
individual institutions will use umbrella associations as cooperative partners that can 
provide another source for communicating their message to policymakers (Lowery 
and Gray 1998, 236).  I find evidence that the state witnesses may use this method in 
instances where they are in agreement with the consensus of the public official 
association but witnesses from the individual states have easier access to 
congressional hearings.  This may be the case because the state governments can 
move faster than the associations, meaning that the individual state governments can 
present their ideas and positions without taking the preparation time that the 




their agreement with the association in their testimony, signaling that there is broad 
consensus on the issue and that the state has allies that support their policy goals. 
The next theory is that of ―competitive exclusion‖, which expects that 
individual institutions will be motivated to advocate for their interests in part because 
they are unhappy with the advocacy being done by the associations to which they 
belong (Lowery and Gray 1998, 236).  In short, the states may advocate individually 
when they disagree with the policy positions adopted by the association.  This can 
occur because the associations require a super-majority, but not a unanimous vote, to 
come to a policy position, and there are members with views that are left 
unrepresented by the majority-vote.   
Finally, the states may allow their positions to be represented by the 
associations when the state governments can agree on policy process regardless of 
their preferences for policy outcomes.  This final observation is most closely in 
keeping with Madison‘s expectation, quoted at the start of this chapter, that the states 
will work together to oppose federal policy that preempts their authority, even when 
they disagree on the policy outcomes they hope to achieve.  It is likely that this can 
occur only on relatively narrow policies in the right type of political environment. 
State Witnesses Signaling Agreement with the Association 
In March of 2003, three governors appeared before a hearing in the 
Subcommittee on Health within the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.  
The intention of the hearing was to present the perspectives of the States on potential 
reforms to Medicaid (see the Appendix for all hearings referenced in this 




governor‘s innovations in implementing Medicaid and the challenges they faced 
under the current structure of the program.  The governors who testified were Jeb 
Bush, a Florida Republican, Bill Richardson, a Democrat from New Mexico, and Bill 
Rowland, the Republican governor of Connecticut.  All three of these governors were 
active members of the National Governors Association, but as witnesses they were 
identified as only testifying on behalf of their state governments. 
Though the hearing was not held to consider Medicaid reform proposals by 
the Bush Administration, and this point was reiterated several times by the 
subcommittee chair, the witnesses and members of Congress who spoke in the 
hearing all addressed the administration proposals and expressed their support or 
opposition to them.  While there were clear partisan divisions in the statements by 
members of Congress, the testimony of the governors was less divisive.  The 
governors from Connecticut and New Mexico were both former members of 
Congress, and Governor Richardson had been a member of the Subcommittee on 
Health during his tenure, so even members from the opposing party expressed an 
interest in hearing the ideas and concerns of their former colleagues.   
The Republican witnesses, Governor Bush and Governor Rowland, were both 
most concerned with increasing the flexibility that the states would have to implement 
the federal policy.  Rowland said he felt hamstrung by members of Congress who 
thought they could run his state better than he could.  Governor Bush took a less 
antagonistic stance toward the federal government but explained that the bureaucratic 
process for requesting the waivers that allow the states to innovate in their Medicaid 




their preference for more policy flexibility and not necessarily more federal money 
for their states.  Their fear was that the federal government would cut money and 
would fail to increase the state‘s flexibility, forcing the states to spend more of their 
own budgets to implement policy preferences forged inside the Beltway.  Governor 
Richardson did not disagree on the need for policy flexibility, but he did express his 
opinion that the federal government would hurt the foundations of Medicaid if it gave 
the states more flexibility but less money for policy implementation.  He argued that 
this would result in a net loss for society as states responded by cutting eligibility for 
entitlements among populations in need. 
Despite these disagreements on their policy preferences, the three governors 
did all agree on the need for Medicaid reform, the need for the federal government to 
learn from the innovations and struggles in the states, and the important role that the 
National Governors Association could play in helping to develop these reforms.  All 
three governors mentioned their involvement as members of the NGA and the fact 
that the NGA was convening a committee to study the issue and establish bipartisan 
agreement on preferred policy reforms.  At the time of the hearing the NGA had not 
yet reached an agreement that they could present to Congress.  A small group of 
Republican governors, including Governor Bush, had authored a joint letter to the 
George W. Bush Administration making policy recommendations and Governor 
Richardson referenced policy proposals endorsed by the Democratic Governors 





This example illustrates one of the weaknesses of public official associations 
that reaches beyond partisan divisions.  These associations are political institutions 
and, like Congress, the NGA does its work through a committee process.  While the 
process results in proposals that are well-researched and draw legitimacy from their 
bipartisanship, they take time to work their way through the deliberative process 
(Herian 2011; Nugent 2009).  Thus, the state governments may be acting consistently 
with the ―signaling theory‖ of institutional interests groups, where they are in 
agreement with their umbrella association and want to signal to lawmakers that there 
are multiple interests with the same policy goals.  However, the states may testify 
more frequently than the associations even when there is some consensus across the 
states on an issue because the public official associations are not yet ready to take a 
stand on the issue. This could mean that individual state governments are better 
equipped to influence policy early in the process, when the committees are still 
defining the problems, considering alternatives, and deciding on the scope of the 
agenda.  The associations would then be limited in their role if they enter the process 
after the agenda is set and the alternatives agreed upon.  Scholars largely agree that 
the early points in the policy process are where power is concentrated because this is 
where many of the important decisions about policy priorities are made (Bednar 
2009; Schattschneider 1960).  
Competitive Exclusion: When the State Disagrees with the Association 
When Richard Russman, state senator and chair of the New Hampshire Senate 
Environment Committee, testified before a joint subcommittee hearing within the 




Hampshire, he was testifying in opposition to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures.  Russman was a former member of the NCSL‘s Committee on the 
Environment but at this hearing he was opposed to the policy recommendations made 
by this prominent public official‘s association.  The NCSL was represented in the 
hearing by Craig Peterson, the Majority Leader of the Utah Senate, who testified on 
behalf of his state and also described the policy positions of the NCSL.   
The hearing took place in the spring of 1997 and involved congressional 
oversight of new national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) being developed by 
the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act.  The controversial 
standards stirred up regional divisions in the country and state government witnesses 
testified in this hearing on behalf of Utah, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio.  The NCSL expressed their concern that the EPA had not 
conducted appropriately extensive research before beginning to generate these new 
standards.  The association asked that the agency consider the geographic, 
meteorological, and climactic differences across states and not adopt standard rules 
that treat all states the same.  Peterson recommended, on behalf of NCSL, that the 
subcommittees treat the NCSL as an expert on problems that arise in the bureaucratic 
rulemaking process over time.  NCSL believed that if the new rules went into effect 
after an expedited review process that later review would result in overturning the 
original rules which would be costly and confusing for states to implement.  The 
states would need to purchase new equipment in order to comply with the new 
standards, so NCSL recommended a full review prior to adoption so states could be 




worthwhile.  Furthermore, if Congress would not fully fund the new requirements 
under these rule changes then this would be considered an unfunded mandate on the 
states. 
Russman criticized the NCSL‘s statement on the basis of the association‘s 
standard process for evaluating new agency standards, saying that they were jumping 
to critique a proposed rule in the way that they would usually reserve for critiquing 
final rules.  He walked through the list of NCSL suggestions and criticisms arguing 
that they were misguided, except where they asked Congress to fully fund new rules 
to avoid unfunded mandates.  Russman submitted a list of state and local government 
and industry members who worked with the EPA to craft the new rules.  He argued 
that the state governments had already had an opportunity to participate in the 
rulemaking process through the efforts of these individuals.  Though he was not 
identified as speaking on behalf of any association other than his state of New 
Hampshire he often referenced the opinions of the other New England states and 
presented findings compiled by a group called the Northeast States for Coordinated 
Air Use Management.  He argued that the EPA would need to establish uniform 
standards for all states since the Midwestern states were known to shirk their clean air 
responsibilities, resulting in air pollution drifting into other regions. 
Obvious regional divides were illustrated throughout the state witnesses‘ 
testimony on this policy.  While the NCSL achieved the super-majority vote of its 
members to adopt a policy stance on this issue, they were not able to appease all of 
the states with their testimony.  The opposition was noticeably unrelated to partisan 




subcommittees, with the Republican members skeptical of the new EPA standards 
and the Democrats supportive of uniform air quality rules for all the states, but the 
state witnesses were mixed.  Democrats from the state legislatures of Michigan and 
Pennsylvania agreed, at least in part, with Peterson, the Republican from Utah who 
spoke for the NCSL.  Their testimony more closely resembled the ―signaling theory‖ 
discussed above, where they explained their own state‘s issues but also voiced 
agreement with their umbrella association‘s policy position.   Russman, a Republican 
from New Hampshire, was joined by a Democrat in the New York State legislature in 
his support of the EPA and opposition to the NCSL‘s position. Russman emphasized 
the partisan divides in his own state yet said that there was bipartisan agreement 
throughout the governor‘s office, agencies, legislature, and state industries to support 
the new EPA standards.   
Russman‘s testimony was motivated by his disagreement with the umbrella 
association in which his institution was a member and he presented the policy 
position of the states that were unhappy with the advocacy being done by the 
association representing them.  Dinan (2011) found evidence of similar disagreements 
during the debates over health insurance reform in 2009.  Members of the NCSL 
endorsed a provision that would allow the federal government to create a ―public 
option‖ health insurance plan to compete against private insurers but later some state 
officials advocated individually for the ability to opt out of the public insurance 
option.  In each of these cases, partisanship didn‘t prevent the NCSL from adopting a 
position on behalf of the state governments, but other divisions prompted disaffected 




When the States agree on Process, Regardless of Policy 
The previous examples focused on the circumstances in which the state 
governments might be compelled to testify individually rather than letting the public 
official associations represent their views.  But there are also situations where the 
associations are well-suited to represent the states‘ interests and the states will offer 
no opposition or individual positions eroding the legitimacy of the public official 
association‘s testimony.  In one such case, the National Governors Association 
testified before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs regarding proposed 
legislation amending the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  In this hearing the 
Executive Director of the NGA spoke on behalf of all the state governors.  He said he 
felt comfortable doing this, even though the proposed legislation was still under 
review by the governors, because of the NGA‘s long history of negotiation on tribal 
gaming policies on behalf of the states. 
The state governments took a range of positions on the type of gaming they 
wanted in their states. Some states were far more comfortable with a broader scope of 
acceptable Indian gaming than others but all the states could agree on the role they 
should be playing in negotiating gaming compacts and regulating the tribal gaming 
industry, and this should be an important role.  The NGA opposed language in the bill 
that might chip away at the states‘ abilities to establish the scope of gaming allowed 
in their states.  Furthermore, the governors opposed any changes to federal law that 
would allow tribes to negotiate gaming rules with the Secretary of the Interior rather 
than the state governments.  The NGA also criticized the current policy of requiring 




governments that same ability to serve on the oversight body.  Despite their disparate 
opinions on gambling, the governors had established a long history of cooperation 
through the NGA to lobby for increasing the role of the states in negotiating and 
regulating tribal gaming compacts.    
A hearing on a very different policy is also illustrative of the associations‘ 
ability to represent the states when they are unified behind a policy process, even if 
they take very different positions on preferred policy outcomes.  This hearing before 
the House Judiciary Committee heard the testimony of William Waren, the federal 
affairs counsel for the National Conference of State Legislatures over the issue of 
enacting a federal product liability law.  This policy was a key component of the 
Republican‘s Contract with America during the 1994 congressional elections.  The 
party that opposed the growth of the federal government in many ways wanted to 
establish uniform standards for tort reform at the federal level.  The NCSL witness 
pointed out this irony and testified that many of the state governments were strong 
believers in tort reform but they did not believe that the federal government should 
preempt the states in this area.  Waren explained that, despite the states‘ disagreement 
over their preferences for reforms of product liability laws, they were able to agree 
that these laws should be crafted by the states alone.  They could not agree on policy 
outcomes, but they could agree on the process by which those policies should be 
crafted. 
These examples of state agreement on process are clearly limited.  In the 
previous example where EPA standards were under review, the NCSL and some of 




uniform standards to be applied to all states.  There are times where the states are 
willing to stand together to protect their right to a process where they can craft their 
own policies, as Madison expected in Federalist 45.  But there are other times when 
the policy outcomes are so important to the state that it will not stand alongside other 
states to demand more flexibility or oppose preemption. At these times the state‘s 




This chapter has demonstrated that it is important to consider the advocacy activities 
of the individual states in addition to the public official associations in order to 
evaluate intergovernmental influence in American politics.  This is the first study to 
directly compare the advocacy of states and intergovernmental associations. Doing so 
makes it clear that there are differences in the policy areas in which they are most 
frequently involved, the amount of influence they might wield in policy niches, and 
the potential for conflicting arguments to be made by their witnesses.  Close reading 
of the hearing transcripts also provides a means to understand how the advocacy of 
the states and associations fits with the theories of institutional interest group 
behavior.  This helps to explain when and why states advocate individually and when 
the associations have the authority to speak unopposed on behalf of the state 
governments.  
The patterns of witness testimony indicate that in some policy areas the state 
governments and the public official associations spend similar proportions of their 




reflect the overall proportion of the congressional agenda dedicated to these same 
topics.  However, the individual state governments have a stronger presence on 
certain niche issues, especially the environment and education, where they may have 
more of an opportunity to influence federal policy.  The individual state governments 
also have a frequent presence on public lands and water management issues, a policy 
area that cannot be considered a niche because of its large presence on the 
congressional agenda, but in which the individual states are frequent advocates.  
Congressional committee testimony is admittedly only one of many advocacy 
activities in which interest groups, including the state governments, can engage.  
However, Nugent (2009) identifies hearing testimony as a key component of the 
states‘ participation in safeguarding their power in the U.S. system of federalism, and 
Schlozman and Tierney (1986) find that congressional committee testimony is the 
most common tactic used by policy advocates to lobby for interest groups‘ priorities.  
Recent scholarship has found causal evidence that information presented in 
congressional hearings can affect the likelihood that a policy proposal will be enacted 
(Burstein and Hirsh 2007).  Thus, the use of congressional hearings to study the 
trends in state government lobbying of federal policy is well-founded.  Furthermore, 
the fact that the policy focus of state testimony is largely reflective of the policy focus 
of another form of state lobbying, legislative memorials to Congress, provides 
validity that these activities are useful indicators of the state governments‘ federal 
policy priorities. 
The findings described in this chapter indicate that it is not appropriate to infer 




public official associations.  The data indicate that the associations and states have 
different policy priorities and the stories told in the hearing transcripts show that state 
governments may be able to react more quickly to federal policy and thus, be 
involved earlier in the policy formulation process than the public official associations.  
Analysis demonstrates that even when the associations come to a majority consensus 
on a policy, they still may face opposition from the states that were not in the 
majority.  In prior studies, the associations have been pictured as powerful faces of 
the state governments, which at times they are, but often there is dissention that is not 
revealed in the position papers published by the associations.  The states are 
individual lobbyists, as well as members of multi-state associations.  They have 
multiple ways of advocating for their interests in the federal policy process.  In order 
to better understand the nuanced process of state advocacy in a system of federalism, 
attention needs to be paid to the individual states and the way they represent their 











Chapter 3: Representation and Innovation 
 
A recent article in Publius: The Journal of Federalism began with the question, ―Is 
anyone listening to the Laboratories of Democracy?‖ (Lowery, Gray, and 
Baumgartner 2011).  Scholars, pundits, and politicians have referenced the 
―laboratories‖ metaphor for the states since Supreme Court Justice Brandeis first used 
it in a 1932 dissent, making the observation that states in the American system of 
federalism may choose to serve as policy laboratories, trying out experiments from 
which the rest of the country can learn. During the first presidential debate of the 
2012 election, Mitt Romney lauded the concept of states as laboratories of democracy 
in reference to giving state governments more leeway for innovation on Medicaid 
policy (Scott 2012). 
The state as laboratories analogy is apt for understanding policy development 
in a federal system, and it is at the basis of research that studies the correlates of 
policy learning among units of government in American politics.  While much of this 
literature is concerned with the adoption of public policy in one jurisdiction after it 
has been adopted in another jurisdiction, some scholars are recognizing that policy 
experimentation and learning involves a complex process in which the adoption of the 
policy is only one step, with policy attention and development of the policy agenda 
being equally important areas of study (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Karch 2007b; 
Kingdon 2003; Lowery, Gray, and Baumgartner 2011).   
 Karch (2007, 31) states that ―one could reasonably argue that the essence of 
policy diffusion is officials‘ awareness of and interest in policy innovations that exist 




which is the key element of intergovernmental learning and is the rationale for 
studying the aspects of the policy process that came prior to policy adoption.  If units 
of government are learning from one another‘s policy experiments then we can expect 
that there is a process of observation and consideration that takes place prior to any 
bill sponsorships, recorded committee votes, or a legislative chamber‘s rejection or 
acceptance of policy.  Time and resource constraints on lawmakers ensure that they 
are limited to weighing a small number of plausible options (Lindblom 1959; 1979).  
The information that legislators need in order to consider policy options is a valuable 
commodity and those individuals and groups with direct access to lawmakers are in 
the best position to have their interests represented in the policy process (Mooney 
1991).  There is also an expectation that state governments, like other institutional 
interest groups such as universities and corporations, enjoy a privileged position in 
the interest group universe (Salisbury 1984).  It is especially valuable to understand 
patterns in state policy advocacy if governments are treated with more legitimacy 
than other interests seeking to influence Congress.   
Congressional hearings are an important aspect of interest group access to 
lawmakers.  Witness testimony in a hearing indicates that not only does that 
individual or organization have access to members of Congress but also that the 
committee leadership has decided that the policy position held by that witness is 
important enough to be communicated publicly to their colleagues and placed in the 
public record.  From the perspective of federalism, intergovernmental participation in 
hearings indicates that the state governments most frequently invited to communicate 




those with the most opportunity to influence federal policy through vertical policy 
diffusion.  This chapter will evaluate the frequency with which individual state 
governments testified before congressional committee hearings and will consider the 
factors that influence their access to federal lawmakers.  It focuses on two 
explanations for state government participation in the federal policy process: the 




While vertical policy learning from the states to the federal government is less 
frequently studied than horizontal policy diffusion among the states, several studies 
have taken up the question of whether the federal government is effectively utilizing 
the states as policy laboratories.  When Lowery et al. (2011) asked whether the 
federal government was listening to the laboratories of democracy, they conducted a 
macro-level analysis of aggregate policy agendas in the state governments to see if 
they had a direct impact on the policy agenda of the federal legislature.  They failed 
to find support for this model of policy learning in the short term and across a wide 
range of policy topics, but they acknowledged that aggregate policy attention is not 
the only way to conceptualize policy learning and they encouraged further 
exploration of this question using different indicators of learning.   
Studies of vertical policy diffusion involve a number of different ways to 
measure the concept of policy learning. Most of this research focuses on only one 




federal learning from state enterprise zone policy and found that the federal 
lawmakers had some general knowledge of the state‘s experiences when they were 
crafting the federal legislation.  Thompson and Burke (2007) studied Medicaid 
demonstration waivers and found limited evidence that the federal government was 
learning from the states.  Esterling (2009) studied congressional hearings on 
Medicaid, focusing on the interactions in committee hearings between members of 
Congress and witnesses from the state governments.  He found that state witnesses 
were more likely to be treated like experts by the committee members when they 
were testifying on policy where the goals of the federal and state governments 
aligned, such as cost containment for prescription drugs.  When the federal and state 
government interests were not aligned, as in the conflict over intergovernmental 
transfers of Medicaid funds, other witnesses that did not represent the state 
governments appeared to be more persuasive to members of the committees than did 
the state government witnesses.   
While case studies are valuable for understanding the details of the policy 
process in particular context, they are also limited in their scope and shine light on 
only a small portion of the policy agenda.  Likewise, studies focusing only on policies 
that were adopted, rather than policy in other stages of the legislative process that 
may not pass, portray only a small segment of the state‘s potential for influence in 
federal policy.  Boeckelman (1992) examined a wide range of policies and found little 
evidence of federal learning from state policy experience.  However, his study 
focused only on federal policy adoptions.  Weissert and Scheller (2008) studied the 




federal government learned from the states in crafting policy that was signed into law.  
They found only two pieces of domestic health legislation with intergovernmental 




It is important to expand the study of policy learning beyond those cases 
where the federal government enacts a law.  Congress can acquire valuable 
information from the state governments even if this information does not result in 
policy adoption.  An example discussed in the prior chapter is just such a case.  In 
1999, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs heard testimony regarding proposed 
amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  The committee invited testimony 
from the state governments, the tribal leadership, and federal bureaucrats 
implementing the law.  They discovered that there was such a high level of 
disagreement between these groups, and no appetite for compromise, that the 
amendments did not move forward.  This is a case where the federal government was 
actively seeking the opinion of the state governments to inform their policymaking, 
yet what they learned resulted in not adopting the policy under consideration.  Thus, it 
may prove more effective to study policy learning by beginning with the source of 
communication, observed here through congressional committee testimony, rather 
than an expected outcome of that communication, like policy adoption.  
Unlike prior studies of vertical policy learning, this chapter does not limit 
analysis to one policy area, a particular piece of legislation, or only enacted 
legislation.  Instead, it considers the hearing testimony of all of the witnesses from the 
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 Though the authors conclude that there was limited evidence of vertical policy learning in health 
policy, the two pieces of legislation where they did find evidence that the federal government learned 









 Congress).  This range of observations allows for a broader definition of policy 
learning since it considers all cases in which state governments communicated their 
interests to the federal government, whether they were expressly advocating for or 
against federal policy, explaining their experiences in policy implementation, or 
calling attention to a problem in their state to inform federal lawmakers as they 
considered policy options.  All of these circumstances offer valuable opportunities for 
the national government to learn from the states.  By beginning with a source of 
information sharing, this chapter can identify the states that are most frequently 
involved in congressional testimony and seek to  
understand why some have greater access than others
5
.   
General Patterns of State Testimony  
Table 3.1 presents the frequency of congressional testimony by each of the 
state governments during the period between 1993 and 2004.  While the country‘s 
four most populous states were also the four states with the most witnesses testifying 
before both chambers of Congress during this time, it is clear that this story involves 
far more than state size.  There are notably different patterns in state participation 
between the two legislative chambers.  Tiny Vermont, falling in the lowest third of 
the states for its number of witnesses testifying in the House, had the second-highest 
number of witnesses testifying in Senate hearings.  The state of Florida had the 
second highest number of witnesses testifying in the House but didn‘t make it into the 
                                                 
5
 The committee hearings are not the only source of information sharing and policy learning but, for 
reasons outlined in the previous chapter, it is reasonable to assume that the information presented in 
committee hearings represents the policy priorities of the committee and serves as a public record for 




top third of states with witnesses before the Senate.  New York was the only state 
ranked in the top 10 for the number of witnesses in both House and the Senate 
committee hearings.  The great variation in hearing participation among the states 
suggests need for further exploration. 
 
Table 3.1. Frequency of State Government Witness Testimony, 1993-2004 
All Hearings* House Hearings Senate Hearings 
New York 272 New York 189 New York 81 
Texas 210 Florida 157 Vermont 72 
Florida 200 Texas 156 Montana 62 
California 166 California 119 Oregon 62 
Maryland 153 Virginia 109 Idaho 60 
Pennsylvania 146 Maryland 105 Wisconsin 58 
New Jersey 144 New Jersey 105 Ohio 57 
Oregon 143 Pennsylvania 101 Utah 57 
Virginia 143 Illinois 90 Texas 53 
Ohio 140 Michigan 84 Washington 50 
Wisconsin 137 Massachusetts 83 Maryland 48 
Utah 132 Ohio 82 California 47 
Massachusetts 122 Oregon 80 North Dakota 47 
Washington 122 Wisconsin 79 Iowa 46 
Illinois 120 Utah 75 Minnesota 45 
Michigan 113 North Carolina 72 New Mexico 44 
Idaho 110 Washington 70 Pennsylvania 44 
Nevada 106 Nevada 66 Florida 43 
Minnesota 104 Louisiana 59 Hawaii 40 
Vermont 97 Connecticut 55 Nevada 40 
North Carolina 95 Minnesota 55 Massachusetts 38 
Louisiana 90 Idaho 50 New Jersey 36 
Iowa 86 Georgia 44 Rhode Island 36 
Connecticut 85 Arizona 42 New Hampshire 35 
Montana 80 Delaware 40 Wyoming 34 
New Mexico 80 Iowa 40 Virginia 32 
New Hampshire 70 Missouri 39 Alaska 31 
Wyoming 70 Indiana 36 Louisiana 31 
Delaware 69 Kentucky 36 Maine 31 
North Dakota 69 Oklahoma 36 Connecticut 30 




Missouri 64 Wyoming 36 Delaware 29 
Oklahoma 64 New Mexico 35 Michigan 29 
Georgia 59 Kansas 34 Colorado 28 
Rhode Island 58 New Hampshire 34 Oklahoma 28 
Hawaii 57 Nebraska 28 Missouri 25 
Kansas 57 Vermont 25 Arizona 23 
Colorado 53 Colorado 24 Kansas 23 
Kentucky 53 Tennessee 23 North Carolina 21 
Alaska 52 North Dakota 22 South Dakota 21 
South Carolina 52 West Virginia 21 Mississippi 20 
Indiana 51 Rhode Island 20 Kentucky 17 
Nebraska 46 Alaska 19 Nebraska 17 
Maine 43 Montana 18 Georgia 15 
Tennessee 38 Alabama 17 South Carolina 15 
Mississippi 36 Arkansas 15 Tennessee 15 
West Virginia 35 Mississippi 15 Indiana 14 
South Dakota 30 Hawaii 13 West Virginia 14 
Alabama 26 Maine 12 Alabama 9 
Arkansas 24 South Dakota 9 Arkansas 9 
*The total number of witnesses for each state may not be equal to the sum of 




 This chapter explores the factors influencing the frequency of each state‘s 
appearances in congressional hearings by looking at eight committees in the House 
and Senate. These committees represent a mixture of policy committees and 
constituency committees as defined by Deering and Smith (1997).  Deering and 
Smith derived these categories by surveying members of Congress about their 
motives for requesting particular committee assignments.  Constituency committees 
are those whose members use their committee assignment to represent a specific 
demographic constituency in their district – such as farmers or veterans.  Policy 




national issues.  The constituency committees in this study are Energy and Natural 
Resources and Environment and Public Works in the Senate as well as Resources and 
Transportation & Infrastructure in the House of Representatives.  The policy 
committees are Judiciary and Health, Education, Labor & Pensions in the Senate and 
Energy & Commerce and Education & the Workforce in the House.  
 
Factors Impacting the Frequency of State Witness Testimony 
The dependent variable in these models is a count of the number of government 
witnesses from each state testifying before each of eight standing committees in the 
House and Senate during each congressional session from 1993-2004. The 
independent variables in the models are divided into two categories: those indicating 
the state‘s representation in Congress and those representing state-level 
characteristics commonly associated with the state‘s capacity for policy innovation.   
These are based on two hypotheses about the motivations for members of Congress to 
learn from the state governments.  The first is that members of Congress may be 
inclined to invite testimony from officials in their own states.  Their ability to do so 
will vary based on their individual positions of power and the committee placement 
of the state‘s congressional delegation. The second hypothesis is that members of 
Congress may invite testimony from the states that are in the best position to act as 







   Representation 
 The connection between members of Congress and their electorates is well-
studied, but the connection between the federal legislators and their state governments 
is less frequently studied and poorly understood.   One of the fallacies in our 
theoretical understanding of American federalism is that state government interests 
will be automatically protected by the members of Congress who share all or some of 
their constituency.  This presumption is often wrong because members of Congress 
do not necessarily want to give or share credit for favorable policy with officials from 
the state and, thus, federal and state officials are sometimes considered ―rivals, not 
allies‖ (Kramer 2000, 224).    
Despite this competition for credit between officials in the state and national 
governments, there are still several reasons to believe that members of Congress may 
have an incentive to give voice to their state government‘s interests by inviting state 
officials to testify in congressional hearings.  Over time, members of the federal 
legislature have increasingly come into office after first serving in their state 
legislatures (Berkman 1993; 1994).  Berkman argues that this increases the likelihood 
that policy ideas and information will travel from the states to the federal government 
because members have had policy experience in the state and now bring those 
connections and perspectives into the federal government.  Members of the 
committee may rely upon the relationships they built in their own state governments 
and tap into these sources of expertise when they invite former colleagues or 




  Though any member of a committee can request that a hearing be held on a 
specific topic and that certain witnesses be invited, the actual process of doing so is 
controlled by the committee leadership.  Hearing agendas are set by the chair and the 
committee‘s majority party staff in consultation with the office of the committee‘s 
ranking minority member (Sachs 2004; Sachs and Vincent 1999).  Generally, for 
every three witnesses invited by the majority party, one witness can be selected by the 
minority party on the committee.  However, in some cases the majority committee 
leadership can use their power to set the schedule to limit the minority‘s time and 
ability to invite appropriate witnesses.    
The committee leadership also operates under different constraints in the 
House and the Senate.  House committee leaders are constrained to a greater degree 
by their party agenda while the Senate‘s tradition of individual autonomy would 
suggest that the committee leadership would have more leeway to set the agenda for 
their committee hearings without as much interference from the chamber‘s leadership 
(Sinclair 2000).  Furthermore, the Senate maintains a long tradition of protecting the 
rights of the minority party (Binder 1997) which would lead us to expect that the 
ranking minority member could have more power to invite testimony from their state 
in the Senate than in the House.   
 Four measures of a state‘s committee representation in Congress are pertinent 
for hypothesis testing about a state‘s presence in congressional hearings.  The first is 
the number of majority party members from the state serving on each committee
6
.  
The next two are dichotomous measures of whether the committee chair is from the 
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state and whether the ranking minority member is from the state.  Finally, I include a 
measure of the state‘s representation per capita.  There are two versions of this 
measure: a state‘s House representation per capita is used when testing the model for 
witnesses before a House committee and the Senate representation per capita is used 
when modeling state testimony before a Senate committee.  These were calculated by 
dividing the state‘s population by the number of members representing the state in 
each chamber.  This is a necessary control due to the established bias in legislative 
policymaking toward states that are overrepresented in the House and Senate 
(Ladewig and Jasinski 2008; Lee and Oppenheimer 1999). 
 State Innovation 
 The diffusion of public policy among the state governments is a very 
thoroughly studied area of political research and it is reasonable to expect that some 
factors which are important in explaining state-to-state learning will also be important 
for understanding which state are engaged in state-to-federal policy learning.  Early 
advances in the study of policy diffusion sought to identify states that were likely to 
be policy innovators – spearheading new policy solutions that would be adopted by 
other states.  Walker (1969) found that slack resources could explain a state‘s lack of 
innovation, as states with less wealth, urbanization, and industrialization could not 
afford to develop potentially costly policy experiments.  If the federal government 
seeks to learn from the states with the greatest capacity to grapple with societal 
problems and innovate on public policy then, based on the slack resources hypothesis, 
they would be more likely to invite witnesses from the governments of states that are 




in this chapter use the state‘s real per capita income (inflation adjusted) as a proxy for 
slack resources.  Urbanization is measured as the state‘s population density. 
 A state‘s legislative professionalism is another key explanatory variable for 
the state‘s capacity to innovate in areas of policy and become a source of policy 
diffusion and learning.  Legislative professionalism is a concept that scholars have 
tried to measure since the early 1970‘s as they sought to make a connection between 
the institutional structures of state government and the policymaking capacity of the 
jurisdiction (Grumm 1971).  Currently, the index created by Peverill Squire (1992; 
2007) is commonly used to assess the professional capacity of the state legislatures.  
It uses specific qualities of the U.S. Congress as a baseline against which it measures 
the member salary, average days in session, and average staff per member of the U.S. 
state legislatures.  The resulting measure is a scale from 0 to 1 indicating the level of 
similarity between the state legislature and the federal legislature on these 
characteristics, with a score of 1 being a perfect match.  
Theoretically, more professionalized legislatures result in a longer-serving and 
more experienced body, better qualified members, more time dedicated to policy 
development and deliberation, and more balanced policy influence between the 
legislative and executive branches (Squire 2007).  Empirically, legislative 
professionalism has been correlated with higher legislative efficiency, the number of 
bills enacted per legislative day (Squire 1998), increases in the adoption of highly 
technical and complex policy (Ka and Teske 2002), and the production of more 
innovative public policy because members have more incentive to become policy 




2005).  All of these qualities should incentivize members of Congress to want to hear 
from witnesses in state governments with more professionalized legislatures.  
Furthermore, a state‘s legislative professionalism is closely tied to the state 
governor‘s decision to maintain a branch office in Washington, another indicator of 
intergovernmental influence and the state‘s interest in maintaining relationships with 
federal lawmakers (Jensen 2010). 
The final innovation variable represents scholars‘ attempt to go beyond 
measures of state capacity for policy innovation and instead measure the actual 
policy innovation of a state government. Walker (1969) originated this line of inquiry, 
but the most recent development calculates an updated measure of a state‘s rate of 
policy adoption during two-year periods using 189 policies that were enacted in the 
states between 1912-2009 (Boehmke and Skinner 2012).  The benefit of including 
this measure in addition to traditional predictors of policy diffusion is that Boehmke 
and Skinner‘s (2012) dynamic measure of policy innovation has more variability than 
measures of urbanization, per capita income, or legislative professionalism.  For 
instance, during the period of this study, 1993-2004, the state of New York had very 
little change in its measure of legislative professionalism but its dynamic measure of 
policy innovation changed every two years, ranging from 0 in a year where none of 
the policies were adopted, to .14, in its most innovative period
7
.  Thus, the model 
contains three measures of policy innovation that are relatively stable over time and 
one that varies based on the state government‘s rate of policy adoptions over a two-
year period. 
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 The dynamic policy index is calculated as a rate ranging from 0 to 1 (0 indicates that none of the 
policies were adopted during that period, 1 would indicate that all were adopted during that period). 





Committees in the House of Representatives 
Table 3.2 presents the results of a negative binomial regression model for the number 
of state government witnesses testifying before four committees in the House of 
Representatives during each congressional session.  The table presents coefficients 
and also the standardized incident-rate ratios for the variables that reach accepted 
levels of statistical significance. The standardized incident-rate ratio (std. IRR) is 
interpreted as the factor change in the dependent variable for a one-standard deviation 
increase in the independent variable. Values greater than one indicate an increase in 
the rate of witness testimony and values less than one indicate a decrease.   
Across all four House committees the variable with the most consistent, 
positive relationship to the number of witnesses from a state government is the 
number of majority party members serving on the committee.  The presence of a 
committee chair from the state was never related to an increase in state witnesses and 
the presence of a ranking minority member from the state was only positive and 
statistically significant for one House committee, Transportation.   The measure of 
House representation per capita yielded positive and statistically significant results for 
two of the House committees, Education & Workforce and Energy & Commerce.  
Thus, states with an apportionment that over-represents their population in the House 
of Representatives are expected to have a higher number of witnesses from their state 
government testifying before these two committees than those states that are under-
represented.  This is especially notable since the model controls for the number of 




independent effect, beyond the benefit of having a larger delegation to sit on the 
committee. 
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   (1.121)   (0.792)   (1.263)   (0.946)   
negative binomial regression with robust standard errors clustered by Congress, two-tailed test 
 N = 300 ** p<.01 *p<.05 
       
Of the policy innovation variables in the House model, urbanization and 
legislative professionalism were positive and statistically significant in three of the 
four committees.  The exception was the House Committee on Resources in which 
Western state officials were frequent witnesses.  In spite of the Western states‘ low 




on issues that are important to the Resources Committee.  This was the one House 
committee in which the dynamic policy innovation index had a positive and 
statistically significant relationship to the number of officials from a state invited to 
testify.   
Senate Committees 
The results for the Senate committee models are presented in Table 3.3.  As in 
the House model, the most consistent factor related to the invitation of state officials 
to committee hearings was the number of majority party members from the state‘s 
delegation serving on that committee.  Unlike the House model, the presence of a 
committee chair from the state had a positive and statistically significant relationship 
to the number of witnesses from that state testifying in three of the four Senate 
committees.  The same was true of the presence of a ranking minority member from 
the state.   
The measure of Senate apportionment also demonstrated a statistically 
significant, positive relationship with the number of state witnesses in three of the 
four Senate committees.  The states that are advantaged in their representation per 
capita in the upper chamber are expected to have higher numbers of state officials 
testifying in committee hearings, even controlling for the presence of majority party 
members on that committee. Far fewer of the innovation variables demonstrated 
notable relationships to the number of witnesses from the state government in the 
Senate committee models than in the House models.  Urbanization had a positive, 




Works.  Likewise, the measure of legislative professionalism was positive and 
statistically significant in only one committee, Judiciary.   
 
Predicted Witness Count 
The standardized incident-rate ratios are a useful measure for comparison 
across variables but they lack an intuitive interpretation for the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables.  Predicted counts provide a simple measure 
SENATE
Coef.             (SE)Coef.             (SE)Std. IRR Coef.             (SE)Coef.             (SE)Std. IRR Coef.             (SE)Coef.             (SE)Std. IRR Coef.             (SE)Coef.             (SE)Std. IRR
Majority 
Members 1.431** 1.82 0.859** 1.42 0.565** 1.27 0.565** 1.26
(0.248) (0.134) (0.135) (0.210)
Chair 0.223 1.324** 1.24 1.380** 1.21 2.059** 1.33
(0.441) (0.206) (0.316) (0.537)
Ranking     
Minority Member 1.711** 1.22 2.093** 1.34 2.193** 1.36 -1.177
(0.549) (0.098) (0.359) (0.995)
Representation 
Per Capita 0.033 0.140** 1.17 0.317** 1.41 0.193** 1.23
(0.080) (0.036) (0.080) (0.047)
Constant -0.706** -0.542 -1.346** -0.928**
(0.219) (0.194) (0.216) (0.218)
Urbanization -0.002* 0.54 0.001* 1.21 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real Per        
Capita Income -0.004 -0.003 -0.025 -0.019
(0.037) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035)
Legislative 
Professionalism 0.578 -0.430 2.306* 1.345 1.376
(1.082) (0.413) (0.916) (0.808)
Policy       
Innovation Index -1.247 1.725 1.503 -3.979
(2.731) 2.241 (1.376) (2.191)
Constant 0.301 -0.028 -0.625 -0.026
(0.711) (0.505) 0.765 (0.765)
N = 300  ** p<.01  *p<.05
Table 3.3. Predicting the Number of State Government Witnesses per Year in Hearings in the Senate 1993-2004
Energy & Natural Resources Environment & Public Works Judiciary Health, Ed, Labor, Pensions




of the relationship: they represent the expected number of witnesses from a state 
during one session of Congress based on the values of the independent variables.  The 
counts were calculated by varying the value of one independent variable while setting 
the other independent variables to their observed values, as suggested by Hanmer and 
Kalkan (2013)
8
.   
 
Table 3.4. Predicted Count of State Witnesses before a House Committee 
House 
Majority Members on 




0 4 Change Lowest Highest Change 
Education & Workforce 0.55 3.60 3.05 0.52 2.06 1.54 
Energy & Commerce 0.99 4.45 3.46 0.80 3.65 2.85 
Transportation 0.81 1.83 1.02 0.64 2.63 1.99 
Resources 0.53 18.43 17.90 2.35 0.51 -1.84 
Note: Predicted counts were calculated using the results from table 2 while holding all variables at their 
actual values.  All reported counts are statistically significant at p<.05 
 
Table 3.4 presents the predicted counts of witnesses before the House 
committees for the two most consistently important variables: the number of majority 
members from the state on the committee and the state‘s measure of legislative 
professionalism.  As the number of majority members on the committee from the 
same state increases from zero members to four members the predicted number of 
witnesses testifying from that state also increases.  The smallest predicted effect is 
seen in the Transportation Committee, where only one additional witness is expected 
from the state.  Both the Education & Workforce Committee and the Energy & 
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 This method involves holding each of the other independent variables at their observed values for 
each case, calculating the relevant predicted count for each case, and then averaging over all of the 
cases to produce the value of the predicted count.  Hanmer and Kalkan demonstrate that this is more 
useful than the ―average-case‖ approach where the values of each of the other independent variables 




Commerce Committee would expect to have approximately three additional witnesses 
from the state.  The largest effect is predicted in the House Resources committee, 
where nearly 18 additional witnesses would be expected from a state if the state‘s 
majority membership on the committee increased from zero to four members.  This 
large value is the result of the number of Western states with multiple majority-party 
members on the committee that routinely sent many state witnesses to testify before 
the Committee on Resources. 
To understand the relationship between the number of state witnesses and the 
state‘s legislative professionalism, the change in the predicted count is calculated by 
varying the value of the legislative professionalism index from the lowest value, .03 
which was held by the state of New Hampshire, to the highest value, .66 which was 
given to the state of New York while holding all other variables in the model at their 
observed values.  The number of witnesses from a state would be expected to increase 
by nearly two in the Education & Workforce Committee and the Transportation 
Committee, nearly three in the Energy & Commerce Committee, and would decrease 
by two in the Committee on Resources.  The expected effect in the Resources 
Committee runs counter to the hypothesis that increased state legislative 
professionalism would result in more witnesses testifying from that state.  This is 
likely because the state government witnesses that dominated that committee came 
overwhelmingly from Western states with low measures of legislative 
professionalism. 
The Senate models showed little evidence of an important relationship 




hearings.  Measures of the state‘s congressional delegation and state representation 
demonstrated consistently positive and statistically significant relationships to the 
number of state government witnesses in the models.  The predicted number of state 
witnesses for the Senate committees is presented in Table 3.5.  Compared to the 
House models, the predicted change in state witnesses for an increase in the number 
of majority party members on the committee is smaller: an increase of nearly two for 
Energy & Natural Resources, but an increase of one or less for the other three 
committees.  It should be noted that the number of majority party members from the 
same state serving on one committee has greater variation in House committees than 
in Senate committees: hence the predicted count is calculated for a change from zero 
to four majority party members of the state‘s delegation in the House but is calculated 
for a change from zero to one majority party member from the state in the Senate.   
 
Unlike the House committee models, the Senate models demonstrated a 




from the state government and the presence of a committee chair or ranking minority 
member from that state.  Compared to a model where the state does not have ties to 
the committee chair,  when the committee chair is from the state the expected number 
of state government witnesses increases by approximately two for the Judiciary 
Committee, three for the Environment & Public Works Committee, and five for the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions.  The expected impact of the 
state‘s relationship to the committee‘s ranking minority member is even larger than 
that of the committee chair.  When the ranking minority member is from the state, 
that state can expect an increase in the predicted number of witnesses ranging from 
approximately four in the Judiciary Committee, five in the Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee, and seven in the Environment and Public Works Committee.   
Three of the four Senate committee models also indicated that states with a 
higher apportionment of representation per-person would expect to see an increase in 
the number of witnesses from the state.  The predicted number of state witnesses 
based on the index of per-capita Senate representation is included in Table 5.  This is 
calculated by changing the index from a value of one, indicating apportionment 
consistent with one person, one vote, to a value of 2.09 which is a one standard 
deviation increase.  Representation based on the one person, one vote model is 
reflected in states like Maryland and Wisconsin, while the standard deviation increase 
is the value of per capita apportionment held by states like Ohio and Illinois.  The 
expected increase in the number of state witnesses is quite small compared to other 






The most consistent and substantively interesting outcome of these models is the 
relationship between the number of majority party members from a state‘s delegation 
on a committee and the number of officials from that state testifying before the 
committee.  This result calls into question Kramer‘s claim that competition between 
state officials and members of Congress prevents members from wanting to promote 
or safeguard state interests (Kramer 2000).  It lends credence to Berkman‘s (1993, 
1994) argument that members of Congress do have incentives to promote the interests 
of their state governments, perhaps because of prior experience holding office in the 
state and drawing upon the expertise of former colleagues to testify in congressional 
hearings. The finding does not necessarily mean that the members and their state 
officials are in agreement on the content or goals of policy.  The relationship does 
indicate that members of Congress give their own state government officials 
opportunities to appear in committee hearings.  Research on the interaction between 
state government witnesses and their congressional delegation members will shine 
more light on what members of Congress hope to learn from state government 
witnesses.  
Another important finding is the rather limited relationship between traditional 
measures of state policy innovation and the number of witnesses from the state 
testifying in congressional hearings.  Of the three measures used to represent the 
capacity of the state to craft innovative policy - urbanization, per capita income, and 
legislative professionalism – legislative professionalism seems to demonstrate the 




of testimony by state officials.  The theory that supports the importance of legislative 
professionalism in state-to-state policy diffusion is also compelling in a model of 
federal learning from state governments.  States with more professionalized 
legislatures are more efficient and execute more complex and technical policy 
(Squire, 1998; Ka & Teske, 2002).  The impact of greater legislative professionalism 
should increase the pool of expert witnesses from the entire state government, not just 
the legislative branch.  If a professional legislature develops complex public policy on 
a wide range of issues then they will have executive branch officials who also 
develop policy expertise as they implement these complex and technical policies, thus 
increasing the number of elected officials and bureaucrats from that state who could 
offer valuable testimony to congressional committees.  In four of the committees, 
three in the House and one in the Senate, the results support this hypothesis. 
 If the relationship between a state‘s legislative professionalism and the 
number of state witnesses testifying in Congress was weaker than expected, the 
relationship between the state‘s actual measure of policy innovation and the 
frequency of state testimony was almost nonexistent.  In only one committee was 
there any evidence that Boehmke and Skinner‘s (2012) index of dynamic policy 
innovation in the state governments had a statistically significant, positive 
relationship to the number of state witnesses testifying in committees.  This may be 
due to the challenges inherent in measuring the actual policy innovation of the states.  
Boehmke and Skinner (2012) acknowledge that their measure is limited because it is 
based on the state‘s adoption rate from a universe of 189 possible policies chosen by 




congressional hearings because the state government might have distinguished itself 
through innovations in a policy area not captured by this measure.  Another 
possibility is that the state might have a history of innovation that isn‘t captured 
during the two-year period of time in which the innovation ratio is calculated or state 
officials might have developed policy expertise through research and debate on policy 
that did not result in policy adoption and thus isn‘t captured in this innovation 
measure that is adoption-dependent.  For any of these reasons the traditional measures 
of a state‘s capacity for policy innovation outperforms this measure of actual policy 
innovation in these models of state witness testimony before congressional 
committees.   
 The differences between the House and Senate committee models of state 
government testimony provide important information for understanding the 
relationship between the state governments and members of Congress.  They also 
expose interesting puzzles about the differences in committee leadership between the 
two chambers.  The House committee models presented a mixed picture where 
measures of state policy innovation and measures of the state‘s congressional 
delegation demonstrated statistical relationships to the frequency of state government 
testimony before the committees.  In the Senate models, the measures of state policy 
innovation were far less important in predicting state witness testimony.  In the 
Senate, not only was there a relationship between the state delegation‘s seats on the 
committee and the invitation of state witnesses, but the presence of a state delegation 
member in a position of committee leadership – either the chair or the ranking 




the frequency of state official‘s testimony before the committee.  This may indicate 
that the Senate and the House retain the representational goals envisioned by the 
founders, in which the House represents the people of their districts while the Senate 
represents the state as a whole – paying special attention to the interests of the state 
government when crafting federal policy. 
 The interesting puzzle arises from the evidence that the presence of a ranking 
minority member from the state is related to higher numbers of state government 
witnesses in House and Senate committees than the presence of a committee chair 
from the state.  Committee chairs have the advantage of their party‘s control in the 
chamber and their own power to direct the legislative agenda for their committee.  
However, it appears that the chairs do not use this authority to highlight witnesses 
from their state government nearly as often as the committee‘s ranking members.  A 
possible explanation is that while the chair has nearly unlimited power to craft the 
agenda of the committee hearing and invite witnesses, she may choose not to invite 
testimony from her own state because she is already aware of the state‘s issue agenda 
and has the power to represent it herself.  The ranking minority member and the rank-
and-file committee members, lacking the power to control the committee‘s agenda, 
might then request to have their states‘ voices heard in committee testimony.   This 
also might result from the ranking member using his opportunity to invite witnesses 
as a way to cultivate relationships in the state, given that he may not be able to exert 
much influence over policy from his position in the minority party. 
Clearly these models do not depict the full range of factors that impact state 




is a particularly obvious example of this.  It is likely that there are some policy-
specific factors, such as the percent of federal lands in the state, which could explain 
the large presence of Western states testifying in these hearings, resulting in the 
negative relationship between legislative professionalism and state witnesses before 
the House Resources Committee.  However, the purpose of these models isn‘t to 
replicate all of the factors influencing state government testimony, but rather, it is to 
explore some of the common predictors of state-to-state policy diffusion in a model 
of state participation in the federal policymaking process.  The results provide 
valuable information regarding the factors predicting which state governments are 
most frequently represented in congressional hearings and contribute to the 
development of the federal policy agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
The topics of congressional hearings are often used as measures of the policy 
attention of federal legislators and a reasonable representation of the broad policy 
agenda (F. R. Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Lowery, 
Gray, and Baumgartner 2011).  This dataset, which catalogs the participation of state 





sessions, reveals a great deal of variation among the states in their frequency of 
participation in hearings. The study of state government participation in committee 
hearings provides an opportunity to compare participation among the states and draw 
inferences about the motivations driving members of Congress to invite witnesses 




This chapter examines factors fitting two hypotheses explaining why some 
state governments are given more frequent opportunities than others to communicate 
their experiences and positions to members of congressional committees.  It considers 
measures of congressional representation and tests whether the power and committee 
placement of members of the state‘s congressional delegation can improve the 
likelihood of state government witnesses being called to testify.  It also considers 
measures of the state government‘s ability to craft innovative policy themselves and 
asks whether congressional committees are hearing testimony from those states which 
are most innovative.   
There is evidence that the traditional measures of a state government‘s policy 
innovation predict the frequency of testimony by state officials in some congressional 
committees, especially House committees.  However, more consistent evidence is 
found for a strong link between features of the state‘s congressional delegation, 
particularly the number of majority party members from the state sitting on the 
committee, and the state government‘s participation in House and Senate committee 
hearings. If members of Congress are inviting witnesses from their own states 
because of a desire to learn from state experiences or listen to state interests with the 
intention of developing policy solutions then the results of this chapter provide 
support for a robust safeguard of federalism.  Scholars have provided significant 
evidence that members of Congress represent the interests of their constituents, but 
this chapter demonstrates the connection between congressional delegations and their 
state governments as well.  The following chapter will explore the information that 




relationship between congressional delegation members and the witnesses from their 
state.   
The results of the state innovation variables beg the question: does it matter if 
the U.S. Congress isn‘t consistently seeking testimony from the most innovative state 
governments?  If the structure of a federal system allows for the national government 
to learn from the policy experiments in the states, do the results of this inquiry 
represent a failure to learn from the laboratories of democracy?  It is concerning that 
the states that are most frequently represented in congressional hearings are not 
always those that are policy innovators.  However, I believe that this is as much an 
opportunity to reflect on the measures favored by political scientists as it is a critique 
of policy learning in the federal system.  Even early in the development of the 
research tradition on state policy diffusion, scholars questioned whether it would be 
possible to define certain states as more or less innovative than others (Gray 1973; 
Savage 1978).  Variation in state legislative behavior over time and across issue areas 
limits the generalizability of any quantitative measure of state policy innovation.  
Modeling this concept is inherently challenging.   
Ideally, a quantitative measure of state policy innovation would be both time 
and policy dependent in order to compare and rank the states on their relative activity 
for every issue.  Enormous in scope, this measure would also be fraught with value 
judgments.  If a state passed five laws regarding environmental regulation, but 
modified the legislation to mollify interest group opposition, would it be considered 
more or less innovative than a state that passed fewer but stronger environmental 




on a policy but an executive that is lax in policy implementation?  Would the federal 
government have reason to learn from this state‘s experiments when the programs do 
not live up to the goals of the legislation? However challenging it is to measure the 
concept of state policy innovation, it is notable that traditional measures of the 
concept are not consistently powerful in predicting the number of state witnesses 
invited to congressional hearings.  If members are choosing state government 
witnesses more frequently because of their political motives or their desire to feature 
their own state rather than a more innovative state then, indeed, this would represent a 
failure to learn from the most valuable laboratories of democracy. 
 While this chapter sheds light on some of the reasons why states have unequal 
access to congressional committee proceedings it leaves unanswered a number of 
questions about the impact of this access.  Most prior research on vertical policy 
learning assumes that state officials are educating federal legislators about policies 
crafted by the state governments and encouraging Congress to adopt similar policies.  
However, a large-scale study of state communication to Congress across a wide range 
of policy areas has not previously been conducted, so the nature of the vertical 
learning that takes place in congressional hearings is unknown.  The prior chapter 
discussed the advocacy activities of the public official associations and demonstrated 
that this advocacy is used to communicate the policy preferences of the associations 
in much the same way that non-governmental interest groups advocate for their 
preferred policies.  It is possible that the individual state governments are featured in 
hearings, not as models of innovative policymaking, but as advocates expressing their 




between congressional committee members and the state witnesses in their hearings 
to provide more information about the policy learning that takes place when the state 
























Chapter 4: Learning from the States? 
 
The prior chapters have considered the frequency with which public official 
associations and individual states testify in congressional hearings.  The findings are 
informative in that they illustrate patterns about intergovernmental advocacy that 
were previously unknown but they aren‘t really valuable without understanding the 
content of the communication and its potential to educate and persuade federal 
lawmakers.  In order to evaluate whether the state governments are being invited to 
testify based on their policy expertise or to fill some other purpose it is necessary to 
examine the testimony of these witnesses and their interactions with members of the 
committees.  
State-federal relations in health policy has been characterized as the 
―continuing struggle of the states, torn between sovereign and supplicants in their 
wish to call on the federal government for more financial support but desperate to 
control their own health policy destinies‖ (W. G. Weissert and Weissert 2012, 6). 
This image of the states requesting more money from the federal government while 
also requesting more flexibility over policy implementation is a well-established 
paradigm for the tensions of the federal system.  It stands in opposition to the more 
optimistic image of the states as democratic laboratories educating members about 
their policy experiments.  The first represents communication between units of 
government that is rote and predictable, unlikely to present new information to 
members of Congress.  The second represents the idea that a system of federalism 




and learn from one another.  It is the image of the American system captured by E.E. 
Schattschneider (1960) when he described the potential to widen the scope of conflict 
over policy by pursuing policy goals in multiple jurisdictions.   
Much of the media and scholarly attention to issues of federalism has focused 
on conflicts over preemption of state policy and unfunded mandates.  If the state 
governments are simply appealing to Washington for more money and more policy 
discretion, then their participation in federal policymaking would not represent an 
example of learning from the laboratories of democracy.  This overwhelming focus 
on conflicts between the levels of government ignores the cases where government 
officials might be learning from one another.  A state official may testify against 
legislation that imposes burdens on the state by describing the state‘s policy 
innovations and explaining how the federal law would limit the state‘s ability to 
handle policy problems in its own jurisdiction.  This type of communication marries a 
discussion of state advocacy over federal policy with examples of state policy 
experiments that do provide an opportunity for intergovernmental learning.  It would 
not be an example of Congress learning from state experiences with the intention of 
replicating successful state policy, but it does illustrate the type of intergovernmental 
lobbying and bargaining that could protect the balance of power in American 
federalism. 
 The prior chapter indicated that the committee assignments of state delegation 
members are more important in determining the invitation of witnesses from the state 
government than is a state‘s level of policy innovation.  This relationship sheds doubt 




in the states but it does not eliminate the possibility that policy learning is taking 
place during these interactions.  This chapter takes up the question of what the federal 
government wants to learn from the states when state government officials are invited 
to testify in congressional hearings.  It diverges from prior studies of vertical policy 
learning by including hearings that did not necessarily result in passage of legislation.  
This recognizes that hearing witnesses can educate members of Congress even if 
there isn‘t immediate policy change reflecting that learning.  Communication, agenda 
setting, and debates over policy values and the proper purpose of government take 
place between state and federal officials throughout the policymaking process.  
 
States and the Ongoing Tensions of Federalism 
Some theories of intergovernmental relations see the states as advocates for a balance 
of power that protects state interests in the federal system (Kincaid 1991; Nugent 
2009).  Members of Congress, for pragmatic or philosophical reasons, may also seek 
to protect the states from federal overreach and encourage diversity of policy through 
the states.  In this way, the federal government can use state testimony in hearings for 
a few purposes.  If the committee has the inclination to centralize power over a 
policy, they may highlight a successful state policy experiment that they intend to 
establish as a mandate for all states.  If the committee has the desire to decentralize 
power over a policy, they may highlight state problems complying with federal 
mandates and the states‘ need for more flexibility in order to craft useful solutions to 
social problems.  And, if the committee wants to encourage the state governments to 




area, then the committee may highlight a state‘s policy as an educational tool; a way 
to present an innovative solution to a problem that could be voluntarily adopted by 
other states.  In this way the committee hearing would function as an information 
clearinghouse where the greater media and public attention to federal policymaking 
could be used to communicate state solutions that should be implemented by other 
states. 
These possible relations between members of the state and federal 
governments reflect the tensions and competing values inherent in the American 
federal system.  Steuerle et al. (1998) explain that if a ―best‖ policy were known then 
the most efficient power allocation would be one in which all policy was crafted and 
implemented by one unit of government.  However, this is both antithetical to 
American values and unlikely since it is rare that politicians can agree on the ―best‖ 
program to achieve policy goals.  As policy is crafted and implemented at various 
levels of government there needs to be a forum where the various units of government 
can meet to discuss the problems and solutions and discover ways to improve 
efficiency even as states and localities maintain their involvement in crafting and 
implementing policy.  Congressional hearings are one place where the role of 
government and allocation of power can be debated.  The tensions of federalism exist 
between the competing values of equality and diversity as well as between uniformity 
and experimentation.  Where equality and uniformity of policy are favored, the 
central government will play a more important role in policy but when diversity and 
experimentation are favored policy will be devolved to the states and localities.  One 




central government passes laws establishing a minimum level of uniformity and 
equality, thus codifying base expectations while allowing states and localities to 
experiment beyond that level (Steuerle et al. 1998). 
 
Policy Learning and Representation 
Any study seeking to explain what Congress wants to learn from the state 
governments needs to first acknowledge the diverse scholarly perspectives on this 
question.  As the prior chapter discussed, scholars who have examined state 
participation in the policy process have primarily focused on one piece of enacted 
policy or a few policies in one issue area (Esterling 2009; C. S. Weissert and Scheller 
2008; Mossberger 1999; Thompson and Burke 2007).  Boeckelman (1992) did look 
for federal learning from the states on a range of issues but he developed a narrow 
definition of policy learning.  He argued that states can serve as laboratories in two 
ways: by diffusing their policy innovations to other states or through federal adoption 
of state policy. Boeckelman posited that there are good reasons for the states to learn 
from one another when crafting policy since the states operate with limited 
informational resources.  However, he did not believe that the federal government 
would have the same motivation to learn from state policy since Congress has more 
resources in the form of staff, expertise, and interest group involvement than the state 
legislatures.  This argument ignores several important features of the national 
legislative branch.  Congressional workload is very high so information shortcuts are 
efficient ways to help members of Congress make policy decisions.  Members of 




negative effects.  Finally, there is an electoral connection to the states that 
incentivizes relationships between the state‘s congressional delegation and the state 
government.   
Even given the erosion of the institutional features that linked the 
congressional delegation to the state government, such as the selection of senators by 
the state legislatures and the role of the state party in candidate selection, there are 
still reasons to believe that a state‘s policy experiences are informative to their 
congressional delegation.  If the state government is responding to policy priorities of 
the constituents then it is beneficial for members of the state delegation to pursue 
those policy objectives, or at least call attention to them.  By learning from the policy 
experiments in the states the members of Congress are meeting two goals: they are 
reducing their workload by learning from the experiences of a government that has 
already invested the start-up costs of adopting and evaluating a policy in its own 
jurisdiction and they are responding to policy priorities of their constituents.  Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver (1994) argue that state governments are quite attentive to the 
policies preferred by the majority of the public in the state.  Thus, state policy 
development can provide a heuristic for members of Congress to observe the 
priorities of their constituents and learn from the policy experiences in their states.  
Furthermore, members of Congress are risk averse so they value learning 
about policy experiences in other jurisdictions in order to understand the potential 
benefits and unintended consequences prior to enacting legislation (Leyden 1995; 
Burstein and Hirsh 2007). Through this lens policy learning from the ―laboratories of 




which would help them to evaluate the outcomes of policy and the political 
implications of pursuing it.  This behavior would be consistent with the theory of dual 
congresses where members must balance their responsibility to make national policy 
with the imperative that they represent district or state constituencies (Herrnson 2007; 
Davidson, Oleszek, and Lee 2011).  This conception of policy learning would not 
necessarily highlight the work of the most innovative state governments.  If members 
are primarily motivated by political and representational goals then they will seek out 
testimony from their own states regardless of the state‘s level of policy innovation.  
They may hope to learn from state policy experiences, but will not get the full benefit 
of this learning opportunity if they fail to bring in state officials with the most 
expertise.   
 This chapter will consider the interaction of state officials and members of 
Congress in committee hearings to determine what members want to learn from the 
states and the extent to which other goals of the members are supported by their 
interaction.  In addition to the goal of crafting good policy, members of Congress can 
be expected to pursue goals related to reelection and political influence through their 
participation in congressional committees (Fenno 1973; Smith and Deering 1983; 
Deering and Smith 1997). 
 
Method 
This chapter uses the transcripts of congressional committee hearings in which state 
government witnesses testified in order to evaluate several questions, primarily, what 




communication represent an attempt to learn from the policy experiences in the state 
government?  This information is gleaned from the opening statements made by 
members of the committee, especially those of the chair and ranking minority 
member, which explain the purpose of the hearing and the reason for inviting certain 
witnesses.  It also comes from the questions that members ask of the hearing 
witnesses after they have delivered their prepared testimony.  The second set of 
questions I ask concern the content of the state official‘s testimony.  What message 
are they delivering to the committee?  Does it fit within the accepted paradigm of 
more money and more policy flexibility for the states?  If they are taking a position 
on policy then what type of evidence do they offer to support their position? How 
does it compare to the content of other witnesses, especially members of Congress 
who testify in the hearing?  Do the state witnesses provide additional information 
about policy experiences in their jurisdiction that members of Congress do not?  
In order to answer these questions I engage in close reading of congressional 
hearing transcripts.  Between 1993 and 2004, 4,692 witnesses from the states and 
public official associations testified before congressional committees.  It would be 
impossible to read and manually code the content of each of these hearings in a 
reasonable amount of time.  This is especially true since the puzzle of what the 
members of Congress seek to learn from the states and what information the state 
witnesses provide the committee cannot be gleaned from a simple reading of the 
witnesses‘ prepared statements.   These questions require examination of the 
statements of committee members, especially the introductory statement by the chair, 




Esterling (2009) found that the questions asked of witnesses in committee hearings 
provided important information about the way members of Congress perceived 
witnesses and whether they were interested in learning substantive, falsifiable 
information that could inform legislative decisions. 
To draw conclusions about the relationships between members of a state‘s 
congressional delegation and the state‘s government witnesses I initially selected a 
sample of hearings with witnesses from three states: Maryland, Tennessee, and 
Oregon.  This was to ensure that there would be variation in the geographic interests 
of the states and the partisan make-up of the state government and state congressional 
delegation.  These states also represent variation in their rate of participation in 
congressional hearings.  One-hundred and fifty-three government witnesses testified 
from the state of Maryland, 143 from the state of Oregon, and 38 from Tennessee.  
For comparison, the state with the highest number of witnesses during this time 
period was New York with 272 and the state with the fewest witnesses was Arkansas 
with 24. While the sample of hearings was drawn based on the presence of a witness 
from one of these states, many of the hearings featured witnesses from other state 
governments.  
Additionally, as features of a hearing raised new questions I selected 
additional cases for consideration.  For instance, in 2002 the Subcommittee on Public 
Lands and Water Management in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources held a field hearing in Redmond, Oregon.  The only member of the 
committee present was Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon and the content of the hearing 




understand if all field hearings were used for this reason I selected several more cases 
in Maryland, Tennessee, New Mexico, Colorado, California, and Florida that 
provided varied perspectives on the purpose of field hearings. The appendix provides 
a full list of the hearings used in this analysis and the state government officials 
testifying in the proceedings. 
 
State Testimony and Policy Learning 
Analysis of the hearing transcripts demonstrates five primary conclusions about the 
role of state government officials in congressional hearings and their implications for 
federal policy.  Each of these are explained here and then illustrated through 
discussion of specific cases. 
Policy is complex. The dominant image of policymaking in Washington is of 
two opposing camps sparring over well-known policy divisions.  This is not the 
image that one sees in congressional hearings featuring the testimony of state 
witnesses.  Few hearings demonstrated partisan division among the members and 
even fewer highlighted the partisanship of state government witnesses.  In several 
hearings a partisan issue, such as whether abstinence-only education is effective at 
reducing teen pregnancy, was raised briefly and then very clearly avoided by all 
participants in the hearing.  The focus of these hearings was on policy detail: effective 
strategies for program implementation, ways of measuring progress toward policy 
goals, suggestions for program design and management, and examples of cooperation 
between governments and agencies.  The amount of cooperation and coordination 




Even when members of the committee and non-governmental witnesses exhibited 
partisan conflict the witnesses from the state governments rarely did.  
Members of Congress pay attention to policy experts. Members on the 
committees wanted to hear about policy examples in the states, both to understand 
what was politically possible and what the actual outcomes of public policy were.  
Salisbury‘s (1984) theory that institutional interests have greater legitimacy than other 
types of interest groups in legislative lobbying was born out in these cases.  State 
officials and the directors of federal agencies were treated very similarly when they 
testified in committee hearings.  Local officials and non-governmental organizations 
involved in the implementation of policy were also questioned as experts.  This was 
the case whether the committee was holding an oversight hearing to evaluate policy 
or holding a legislative hearing to craft new policy (though these distinctions were 
rarely meaningful, as I discuss later).  For the most part, elected officials from the 
states were better able to speak about the political feasibility of policy while officials 
from state agencies were better able to discuss the details of implementation. 
Members of Congress asked more questions about policy implementation and 
management than they did about constituent reactions to state policy or the political 
environment in the state.  The political feasibility of policy was implicit in many state 
witness statements. 
Members simultaneously engage in policymaking and representation. The 
selection of witnesses combined the goals of learning from innovative state policy 
and featuring states connected to committee members.  Often a witness fulfilled both 




measures, had witnesses testifying about novel state policies.  Members of Congress 
may hope to feature witnesses from their states for purposes of representation but 
they also have incentives to choose members of the state government who are experts 
in policy. There were few instances where a state witness gave testimony that was 
purely emotional or partisan without demonstrating a substantive grasp of the policy 
under discussion.  These witnesses also provided the committee with information and 
examples that would be valuable to the policy debate in Congress.  
Hearings can play a symbolic role. This may be one of the dominant public 
perceptions of congressional hearings because the hearings that the public is most 
likely to learn about are those that are staged for maximum media exposure.  None of 
the hearings featuring state witnesses seemed primarily geared to an audience beyond 
the hearing room but some committee chairs did express the goals of using the 
hearing to reach an outside audience such as the White House, other members of 
Congress, specific policy stakeholders, and the general public.  In some hearings a 
member of the committee said that the hearing was staged for the purpose of moving 
a piece of legislation along by framing it in a certain way.  Even in hearings where the 
members acknowledged symbolic goals there were often still examples of policy 
learning from the state government witnesses.  In these cases the state witnesses were 
likely selected to help with the symbolic goal of the hearing but, unlike the citizen 
witnesses who were selected to ―put a face on the policy‖, the state government 
witnesses generally received thoughtful, detailed questions from members of the 




 Many sources discuss state policy experiments. Information about problems in 
the states that need policy solutions, as well as state policy experiments, came from 
many sources.  Members of the committee give examples of their state‘s policies.  
Witnesses from federal agencies, local governments, industry, and advocacy 
organizations all referenced state policies.  The difference between the testimony of a 
state government witness and a witness who wasn‘t a state official who referenced 
state policy was the level of detail.  Members of the committee and members of 
Congress from other committees who testified in the hearing demonstrated some 
knowledge of their state‘s policies. But the detail about the political environment 
needed to enact policy and the structure and management necessary for its success in 
the state came primarily from officials in state government. 
 
The States on the Hill 
The following cases illustrate the range of policies on which the state government 
witnesses testified.  The most prominent areas where state witnesses were featured 
included public lands and water, environment, banking and finance, health, crime and 
family, and government operations (which includes policies classified as 
intergovernmental relations and appropriations). 
 Fair Credit Reporting Reform 
The issue of policy complexity and state-federal cooperation was evident in a 
hearing before the Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance in the House 




met to consider H.R. 1015, the Fair Credit Reporting Reform Act which would 
regulate credit bureaus to protect consumers from errors on their credit reports caused 
by the credit bureau and violations of their privacy due to the sale of personal finance 
data.  The goals of the legislation seemed universally agreeable to the members of the 
committee but a prior version of the bill had been defeated during the prior session 
due to conflict over the preemption language.  Committee members expressed their 
determination to pass the law in the 103
rd
 Congress but recognized that they needed to 
bring the state attorneys general on board in order to be successful.  Unified 
opposition from the state governments was credited with killing the bill during the 
prior session even though the goals of the legislation were appealing to members of 
Congress and state officials.   
The attorneys general from Maryland and Illinois testified in the hearing.  
Both Maryland and Illinois had members of their delegation on the subcommittee.  
Representative Gutierrez from Illinois arrived late to the hearing and was unable to 
introduce the Attorney General from his state, Roland Burris, prior to his testimony.  
Gutierrez arrived in time to question the witnesses and apologized to Mr. Burris 
saying that the introduction of a state witness was ―a responsibility, and obviously a 
privilege and an honor‖.  Roland Burris represented his state and also the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) which was in opposition to this bill due to 
its preemption language.  He chaired a committee of NAAG and served on a task 
force of that organization that examined the Fair Credit Reporting Reform Act.  Every 
one of the state attorneys general signed a statement opposing any federal preemption 




Burris justified the opposition to preemption by saying that the states wanted 
to retain the power to regulate credit reporting beyond the regulations stipulated by 
the federal law.  He referenced the fact that 20 states had enacted their own fair credit 
laws and that the states had opportunity to learn from one another and demonstrate to 
Congress the protections that are needed.  His state of Illinois did not have its own 
fair credit law. In response to questions from the committee he said that in the past he 
had introduced a bill in the Illinois legislature that was almost identical to the federal 
law, but it did not pass.  He supported the goals of the federal legislation and wanted 
the federal law to pass so that the citizens of Illinois would have a basic level of 
protection.  However if the federal law retained language preempting the state laws 
then he would not support it.  He hoped that Illinois would pass their own fair credit 
law in the future and he wanted the state to have the flexibility to pass more stringent 
laws than the federal statute if that was the will of the state lawmakers. 
In addition to the preemption language, he opposed the preeminence of the 
federal regulators and argued that the states and the Federal Trade Commission 
should share concurrent enforcement of the law.  He wanted the state attorneys 
general to have the ability to enforce the federal law in state or federal court.  He did 
not believe that the FTC would have the workload capacity to handle the cases that 
were currently being handled by the states.  He cited several examples of antitrust and 
consumer protection laws that were enforced by both the states and federal 
governments as a model for the administration of this legislation. 
Maryland Attorney General Joseph Curran Jr. was introduced to the 




as a policy leader on the issue of credit reporting.  Curran testified that Maryland had 
had a credit reporting law in effect for several years and he used his testimony to 
communicate how the Maryland law was structured, why it was considered very 
effective, and why a federal law would be necessary for states without a law like 
Maryland‘s. Like Burris, he wanted a federal law to establish a baseline of protection 
for the citizens but he opposed a policy that would prevent the states from innovating 
beyond the federal law. 
He specifically called the states ―laboratories‖ when referencing what had 
already been done on fair credit policy in the states.  He defended a controversial 
proposal in the federal law that would allow all consumers to receive one free credit 
report per year in order to check that their credit history was accurate.  This provision 
in the federal policy was receiving push-back from industry lobbyists but the 
provision had been quite successful in Maryland.  He referenced a Maryland 
education campaign encouraging all state residents to check their credit report yearly.  
He asked that the states not be preempted by the federal law because the states were 
doing such valuable and creative work in developing their own credit laws. 
There were other witnesses in the hearing who were consumers expressing 
what they wanted from federal law but the state government witnesses addressed the 
functional details of the federal law: how it would operate and which agencies would 
have the power to implement and regulate it.  The testimony of the attorneys general 
was clearly valuable to committee members as evidenced by the number and details 
of questions asked of them compared to other witnesses.  During questioning both 




the basic rights of consumers but that states were in the best position to defend those 
rights with the coordination of the FTC.  The Maryland AG explained that the people 
of his state would feel most comfortable taking their complaints to state level officials 
rather than the federal officials.  He also argued against preemption because in the 
future the state would need to retain the ability to strengthen the law since state 
lawmakers are closest to the people and know the needs of their constituents better 
than federal lawmakers. 
Field Hearing on Juvenile Crime 
In December of 1996 the Subcommittee on Youth Violence of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee held field hearings in Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee, to 
review problems of youth violence and delinquency in Tennessee and consider 
strategies to prevent juvenile crime.  The chair of the subcommittee was Fred 
Thompson of Tennessee.  He stated that his subcommittee was scheduled to 
reauthorize the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act later that 
year and he didn‘t feel that the federal law had done anything to curb youth violence 
so he wanted to learn about local and state solutions to the problem before taking up 
the federal law.  This was not the only field hearing held by the subcommittee.  
During 1996 he held a series of hearings around the country investigating state and 
local solutions to the issues of youth violence.  These hearings took place in states 
that did not have members of their delegation on the subcommittee or even on the 
Judiciary Committee.  Thompson also held multiple hearings on the same subject in 




Senator Thompson began the hearing in Nashville with a statement of his 
goals for the hearings and the questions that he hoped the witnesses would answer. 
What we essentially are here doing today, in addition to high-lighting the 
problem that we are all too familiar with, is trying to determine what works 
in solving the problem.  Obviously, with the demographics being what they 
are, if we don‘t get ahead of the curve, if we can call it that at this stage, 
we‘re going to be in big trouble in a few years.  So the question is, What is 
working?  What‘s working on the local level?  What‘s working on the State 
level? What‘s not working on the local and State level?  What Federal 
programs are beneficial? (Senate Hearing ―Images, Reality, and Solutions to 
the Violent Juvenile Crime Problem‖ p. 2) 
 
The state witnesses in the hearing included Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist as 
well as two state commissioners from the Department of Youth Development and the 
Department of Health.  One Tennessee state representative and two state senators also 
testified.  It was clear that Senator Thompson already had a relationship with 
Governor Sundquist and their dialog in the hearing was a continuation of prior 
conversations.  The governor highlighted some of Tennessee‘s innovative solutions to 
the problem of juvenile crime but he also used some well-worn phrases in thanking 
Senator Thompson for ―looking outside of Washington‖ for ideas and asking him to 
―cut through the red tape and some of the mandates‖ to get the bureaucracy out of the 
way of Tennessee‘s innovations.  Though the governor did not provide much detail in 
his testimony, the state programs that he introduced in his statement were discussed 
further by the commissioners of the state agencies. 
The two commissioners testified about specific state-wide programs dealing 
with juvenile justice.  They explained in detail how the programs were using federal 
money, what the program goals and outcomes were, and why they needed more 
flexibility in the federal rules to implement similar programs.  The senator asked 




primary argument was that Tennessee was trying to work across agencies to solve the 
problem of juvenile crime but federal money was often tied to specific programs with 
very narrow goals. When the state would receive grant money from three different 
federal programs to address multiple aspects of the problem of juvenile crime they 
had to deal with mandates attached to each little pot of money.  This made it difficult 
for state officials to use federal money in a comprehensive program. They made the 
argument that fewer mandates would allow comprehensive state programs to operate 
with increased efficiency. They also presented an argument for more federal support 
for crime prevention programs.  They recently had federal funds rescinded because 
one of their programs had become too successful and no longer met the requirement 
that it be addressing a ―crisis‖. The senator questioned them about their results and 
whether their outcomes would justify more federal money.  He focused on short-term 
goals of keeping successful programs funded and long-term goals of establishing 
efficient and supportive federal programs for the states. 
Two of the three state legislators testified about the details of state legislation 
to create programs preventing juvenile crime.  The senator was very interested in the 
state legislature‘s oversight of state-wide programs. He complained that at the federal 
level they had little time to evaluate the success of their initiatives and he depended 
on the state to tell him what programs were working.  The third state legislator did not 
give testimony about policy but instead expressed his strong views about the role of 
the federal government and the unconstitutionality of federal mandates on the states.  




ignored this witness during questioning and focused on the testimony of the members 
who spoke about policy details. 
The attention paid to the state witnesses was similar to the senator‘s 
interaction with witnesses who discussed implementation of programs by the local 
governments as well as witnesses from non-profits that were also implementing 
programs dealing with juvenile crime.  The state witnesses provided more detail 
about administrative structures and the local-state-federal-private cooperation that 
was necessary to make these programs work.  Witnesses who delivered statements 
driven by emotion or ideology received less attention from the senator than those who 
spoke about policy. 
States in the Competition over Water Rights 
In July of 1994 the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in the 
House Committee on Natural Resources held an oversight hearing to examine water 
use practices on Bureau of Reclamation projects.  At issue was the practice of ―water 
spreading‖ which was the use of water from Bureau of Reclamation projects in any 
area that wasn‘t authorized to receive it.  Reclamation laws were enacted to govern 
projects funded by federal tax dollars to make water available for specific purposes.  
The hearing was to consider abuses of the law and consider whether federal policy 
changes might be necessary.  There were many competing interests involved in the 
discussion and the members of the committee seemed intent on learning whether the 
current arrangement of state-tribal-community task forces working with the Bureau of 




action was necessary in order to balance tribal water rights, farming water needs, and 
environmental goals.  
 Two members of the Oregon State congressional delegation served on the 
subcommittee and Bob Smith of Oregon was the ranking minority member.  Over 
half of the subcommittee were members of Western states and the members from 
California, Utah, Idaho, and Oregon were most active in this hearing.  The hearing 
involved testimony from federal agencies involved in the enforcement of irrigation 
water use, an official from Oregon‘s Department of Water Resources, Indian tribes, 
environmental groups, and groups representing the irrigation needs of particular 
regions in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. 
 Much of the testimony, including the statements made by committee members 
and a member of Congress from Idaho who testified as a witness, focused on the 
interests of particular groups that were dependent on water for farming and fisheries.  
The members of Congress expressed the concerns they were hearing from their 
constituents and explained that the purpose of the hearing was to try to understand the 
whole picture. The witness from Oregon‘s state government was distinctive in that he 
explained the issue with a level of specificity that none of the committee members 
had expressed in their statements about the problem.  He talked about the problem of 
water spreading from a management perspective and seemed to have a grasp of the 
complete picture as perceived by local interests, state governments, and federal 
program management.  Oregon was considered a national leader in policy relating to 




One reason that Oregon‘s testimony might have been valuable to the 
committee was that the state made an effort to balance economic and environmental 
claims by engaging in open communication with rural, agricultural stakeholders, 
Indian tribes, and local governments.  Oregon had been quite active in task forces on 
Bureau of Reclamation projects.  Members of the committee asked the witness from 
Oregon‘s Department of Water Resources about current conflicts over water law and 
the role that Oregon had played in resolving them.  He advocated more cooperative 
relationships between local, state, and federal interests.  He did not object to federal 
oversight and regulation but he did explain that Oregon state officials worked to be 
respectful of competing local interests as well as federal regulations and suggested 
that whatever action the federal government chose to take to adjudicate these 
conflicting interests, it would need to be respectful of Oregon‘s right to manage water 
distribution in its own jurisdiction. 
Conflict between State and Federal Interests: Assisted Suicide 
In July of 1998 the Subcommittee on the Constitution in the House Judiciary 
Committee held a hearing to consider H.R. 4006, the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention 
Act of 1998.  The bill‘s authors wrote the legislation in response to a decision by the 
U.S. Attorney General that physician assisted suicide did not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and thus, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration had no power to regulate the use of drugs in this procedure.  This 
legislation would make it possible for the Drug Enforcement Administration to 
revoke the licenses of physicians or pharmacists who knowingly used pain relief 




of national debate in response to Oregon‘s legalization of this procedure through a 
state referendum.  There were no members of Oregon‘s congressional delegation on 
the committee but four of the state‘s members of the House testified in the hearing 
and Governor Kitzhaber of Oregon was also a witness.   
 This hearing was quite polarized and displayed more hostility than most other 
hearings featuring state government witnesses.  The chair of the subcommittee made 
an opening statement condemning physician assisted suicide and equated it to other 
practices that he found abhorrent, like partial birth abortion.  The ranking Democrat 
on the committee responded in an opening statement arguing that Congress was 
responding inappropriately to a state law with which it disagreed by threatening to 
undo the will of the people of Oregon using national legislation.   
 Governor Kitzhaber‘s testimony in this hearing focused on the political 
context of the state legislation, emphasizing that the law had passed through a public 
referendum that was widely supported by the citizens of his state.  He also discussed 
the proper role of the governments in a federal system and argued that historically the 
medical profession was regulated by the state governments and not at the federal 
level.  He disapproved of the legislation‘s attempt to restrict physician assisted 
suicide through the indirect means of drug licensing instead of by restricting 
physician assisted suicide outright and having a national debate on that issue. 
There were very few questions for the Governor or any other witnesses on the 
panel.  The Governor was briefly asked about some of the perceived problems with 
Oregon‘s law and he explained that the initiative process in the state had produced a 




to address this and improve the law.  He felt that it would be inappropriate for the 
federal government to enact legislation preempting Oregon‘s law because of a 
perception that Oregon‘s law had not been crafted well. Though disagreeing with the 
legality of Oregon‘s policy, the committee chair agreed that opposition to the details 
of Oregon‘s law should not drive the debate in Congress.  He felt that the general 
principles of the value of human life should guide the committee in establishing a 
federal policy. 
Four members of the Oregon congressional delegation testified against the 
federal law using many of the same arguments as the Governor of Oregon.  They 
argued especially that because the Oregon law was passed by the initiative process 
that this bill would be an example of Washington lawmakers overriding the will of 
the people.  They accused Republican members of the committee of expanding ―big 
government‖.  A few of these members argued that the federal government should not 
interfere in the Oregon law and instead observe what happens and learn from 
Oregon‘s policy experiment. 
It was not evident that members of the committee sought to learn anything 
specific about Oregon‘s policy from the testimony of the governor.  Issues of 
federalism were raised by members of the committee but it was clear that the driving 
issue here was the policy itself and not issues of state policy discretion.  The 
committee spent far more time with the next panel of witnesses which consisted of 
representatives of the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American 
Pharmaceutical Association (APA).  These witnesses also discussed issues of 




level.  They discussed in detail the possibility of eliminating the federal review board 
that was proposed in this law and instead having these regulations administered by 
state medical boards.  The AMA and APA witnesses approved of this state-level 
administration. The questions for this panel from the members of the committee were 
extensive and detailed and a few members of the committee thanked the witnesses 
and commented that they learned something new from the discussion. 
While Oregon‘s policy would be considered innovative, in that it was a 
pioneer in this policy area, it would be unrealistic to expect this hearing to involve 
federal learning from the state‘s policy experiment.  The hearing was held because the 
majority party members, particularly the chair, of the committee opposed the state 
law and wanted to craft federal law that would preempt it.  The state official from 
Oregon was featured as an advocate for his state‘s policy preference, not as resource 
to educate members about a policy innovation. Unlike most of the state government 
witnesses in other hearings, there wasn‘t a substantive difference in the information 
provided by the governor representing the state and the members of Congress from 
Oregon who made statements in favor of their constituents‘ interests.  This was likely 
because the issue was already polarized and controversial and the state of Oregon was 
seen as a party to that controversy instead of a policy expert.  In this hearing the 
AMA and the APA representatives were the administrative policy experts providing 
detail to help the committee improve the policy. 
Representation and Innovation in Housing Policy 
In a hearing before the Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent 




delegates testified about the details of state policy dealing with the problem of 
predatory lending and real estate flipping.  This field hearing took place in Baltimore, 
Maryland, in March of 2000 and it represented an example of the confluence of 
representation of constituent interests and featuring state innovation.  Attention to the 
policy problem came about because Baltimore had the highest rate of FHA 
foreclosures per-capita in the country.  The city‘s newspaper, the Baltimore Sun, and 
some prominent civic associations were investigating the problem and brought it to 
the attention of the public and the policymakers.  Maryland state lawmakers were 
dealing with the problem at the state level and the state of Maryland had two Senators 
positioned on committees where they could do something about this policy at the 
federal level. Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland decided to investigate this issue 
in her subcommittee and also encouraged colleagues in other committees to pursue 
the topic.  She was the ranking minority member of the VA, HUD, and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee.  She was the only member of her committee 
who attended the hearing, though the chair sent members of his staff to listen to the 
testimony.  Senator Paul Sarbanes from Maryland also attended the hearing, though 
he wasn‘t on the committee hosting the hearing.  He was the ranking minority 
member on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.  Through 
this position he would also have an opportunity to influence federal policy on this 
topic.   
The senators were representing the interests of their state government and 
constituents by holding a hearing on this subject but they were also using the hearing 




the state and local level.  They were interested in state policy solutions but also the 
programs being developed by community organizations. They asked many questions 
of the witnesses and set up future meetings to discuss the issue with members of the 
community and state lawmakers.  Senator Mikulski commended the Maryland 
delegates who testified in the hearing for their work on the issue and said that the 
Maryland General Assembly was leading the nation in dealing with the problem of 
real estate flipping.  While this may have been true, it is also likely that the state 
lawmakers and the state‘s senators were all motivated to pursue this issue because of 
the publicity of the problem and the demand of their constituents. 
The testimony of the state delegates explained the legislative effort to require 
licensure for housing appraisers since poor appraisals were one feature of the 
problem.  However, one delegate explained that the bill died in the prior session 
because appraisers were federally regulated so this was a policy that needed to be 
taken up at the federal level.  Maryland had recently closed loopholes in their 
regulations for the housing industry to reduce real estate flipping.  The witness 
encouraged more regulation at the federal level and also recommended that the 
federal government partner with the states to ensure that they were both supporting 
each other in financial regulation and enforcement.  One of the state delegates 
educated the senators about new forms of abuse arising from the practice of predatory 
lenders creating non-profits to provide financial counseling to first-time homebuyers 
and naming their non-profits with the names of prominent community institutions, 
like art galleries and hospitals to make them sound legitimate and trustworthy.  




solution using the Department of Housing and Urban Development to approve the 
non-profits that offered counseling to first-time homebuyers. 
The state government witnesses focused on the political necessity of 
addressing this issue which was so important to the state residents.  Since the 
witnesses were state delegates, their arguments about the necessity of addressing this 
issue came with the message that as state legislators they had the support of their 
constituents to pursue these policies.  Their message was that the state of Maryland 
was crafting innovative policy but it was also politically popular policy. They also 
explained that they had done nearly everything they could do at the state level.  Some 
of the discussion between these witnesses and the senators involved the limits on state 
laws and the need for coordination between federal and state lawmakers to close all of 
the loopholes that invited these practices. Senator Mikulski was open to this 
cooperation and asked what she could do to support the state‘s policy initiatives 
through federal legislation.   
 This hearing represented the symbolic and substantive goals of the members 
of Congress.  Due to the prominence of the housing problem, especially in Baltimore, 
and the demand that government do something to address it, Senator Mikulski and 
Senator Sarbanes had symbolic motivations to hold a field hearing in their state and 
feature victims of fraudulent real estate practices alongside state lawmakers pursuing 
solutions. In was clear that not all of the information presented in the hearing was 
new to the Senators, though both expressed surprise at some testimony and asked 
detailed questions of the witnesses to learn more.  The hearing was part of an ongoing 




Throughout the hearing Mikulski and Sarbanes would address antagonistic 
comments to the house-flippers, as if there was an audience of them watching the 
hearing on-line or on C-SPAN.  They warned those engaging in this practice that their 
abuse of Maryland residents was at an end. The dominant message of this hearing 
was ―something is being done‖ and by inviting the witnesses from the state 
government the message was that something was being done at the state and federal 
levels.  The senators expressed their interest in learning about the policies being 
implemented in the state and they sought to coordinate state and federal policy, but 
the hearing also helped the senators communicate a public message about their 
attention to the problems of their constituents. 
State Governments and the Debate over Federalism 
The 104
th
 Congress saw the Republicans return to power and an increased 
interest in the role that the states and the federal government should play in the 
American system of federalism.  The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
passed in 1995 and welfare reform during 1996 devolved much of the social safety 
net to the states through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 
(PRWORA).  Throughout the spring and summer of 1996 the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs held hearings on S. 1629, The Tenth Amendment Enforcement 
Act, a bill with the stated goal of protecting the rights of the states and the people 
from abuse by the federal government.  It specified a series of parliamentary 
requirements imposed on the legislative branch when considering any bill that had the 




federal regulatory rules and provided guidance to the courts on the interpretation of 
the Tenth Amendment.   
The hearings on this bill reflected a partisan divide among the committee 
members.  The majority saw this as a major priority while the minority expressed 
their support of the intention of the bill but disagreed that it should be a legislative 
priority unless it was proven that UMRA had failed to protect the states‘ interests.  
Witnesses on this legislation were all members of the Senate, officials from state 
governments, city mayors, or constitutional law professors. 
 Over the course of the hearings there were nine witnesses from state 
governments including Alabama, Alaska, Virginia, South Carolina, Colorado, Ohio, 
and three from Tennessee. One of the days of testimony was held as a field hearing in 
Nashville, Tennessee.  The committee chair was Senator Stevens from Alaska and the 
ranking Democrat was Senator Glenn from Ohio.  Senator Stevens interacted with the 
witness from Alaska but Senator Glenn, though present at the hearing and active in 
discussion with his fellow senators, had no interaction with the witness from Ohio.  
Tennessee and Colorado also had members of the state delegation on the committee, 
but only Senator Thompson from Tennessee interacted with the witnesses from his 
state government. 
The bill was such a high priority within the majority party that the Majority 
Leader, Bob Dole, was the first witness to testify in favor of the bill.  The testimony 
from members of the Senate and the statements by members of the committee were 
philosophical, discussing their views on the proper structure of federalism, and 




either unenforceable or would give too much power to the Senate parliamentarian. 
Some of the state witnesses devoted their prepared testimony to statements of 
philosophy about state-federal relations but others gave examples where this bill 
might improve policy problems resulting from the current balance of power.  
Virginia‘s attorney general cited the coersive federal mandates in the Clean Air Act 
and the regulatory burdens attached to grant funds for special education under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.  The solicitor general from Colorado 
testified about the cost of implementing centralized emissions testing program for 
cars. He argued that in matters of environmental protection his state had developed 
ways to achieve national environmental goals at a lower cost than federal programs 
but they had not been able to implement these programs due to federal regulations.   
 The South Carolina attorney general was also a member of the National 
Association of Attorneys General, which had not yet taken a position on the 
legislation but was discussing the possibility of voting on their official position.  At 
the request of the chair he agreed to have his committee staff from the NAAG meet 
with staff from the Senate committee to work on the language of the bill.  Similar 
discussions took place between state legislators who were also in the leadership of the 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).  The NCSL had already taken a 
position on the bill and the organization was anxious to work with the committee staff 
to provide support and suggestions for improving the legislation.  The chair was open 
to bringing them into the process and at the end of first day of hearings he explained 




gathering proof from the states that the bill would be beneficial.  He asked the NCSL 
to suggest locations for the next hearing.   
During the field hearing on this legislation in Tennessee the chair mentioned 
that the NCSL had recommended some of the Tennessee legislators as knowledgeable 
witnesses. The day of testimony in Nashville sought to fulfill the chair‘s goal of 
gathering examples from state government officials but it also produced a 
philosophical discussion about the purpose of federalism and a tactical discussion 
about bringing policy practice in line with their position on federalism.  This 
conversation between Senator Thompson, Senator Stevens, and the state officials 
discussed how to reverse the trend of state dependence on the Federal government.   
Senator Thompson (R-TN). When did we get into the business of Washington, D.C. 
deciding how much money Chattanooga ought to be spending to get a retired person 
across the street or down the street or across town to meet with some children?  How 
do we reverse that process?  Or are what we talking about now, we want the money 
but no strings?  Do we still want the money? Or if we cut the money off, we can‘t do 
that precipitously.  Of course, that leaves the State at greater disadvantage. Do you 
have in mind a process that we can work our way out of this situation? (Senate 
Hearing ―S. 1629 The Tenth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1996‖  p. 81) 
 
The witnesses, a state senator and the president of the Tennessee Advisory Council on 
Intergovernmental Relations, both expressed a willingness to give up some federal 
funding but also the need to do so slowly so that the state and local government 
would have time to improve their management, become more efficient, and decide 
how to increase their own budgets to cover the programs they cared about that would 
no longer have federal funding.  These witnesses, as well as those on other panels, 
expressed their appreciation for cooperative programs where the state governments 




 In some instances the state officials acknowledged the importance of having 
the federal government involved in state policy.  The Deputy Director of the 
Tennessee Division of Drinking Water Supply testified that he supported the Safe 
Drinking Water Act and believed that the federal government was right to be 
involved in this policy area but was concerned that the regulations were coming out 
of the EPA without regard for an implementation time-table that was palatable or 
possible in the states: 
While States can benefit from centralized research and standard setting ability 
of the EPA, in the absence of a crisis or inaction by local government, is it 
wise for Congress or the EPA to attempt to micro-manage issues it assigns to 
States to handle, or for Congress to place statutory burdens on the EPA 
without recognizing the Courts can use the Congressional Acts to enforce 
their own environmental agenda? 
I think we need some uniform standards nationally to prevent States from competing 
for probably not the best issues, but allow the States then to implement, have the 
flexibility to meet or achieve those standards, is what I would look for. (Senate 
Hearing ―S. 1629 The Tenth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1996‖  p. 91-95) 
 
All of the state government witnesses who testified in these hearings supported the 
legislation in some way.  Some offered suggestions for how to modify it but most 
spent their testimony explaining their perspective on federalism from their position in 
a state government.  They provided examples of policy problems and inefficiencies 
resulting from federal preemption that this bill might alleviate.  Members of the 
committee questioned the state witnesses in order to establish why the bill was 
important, emphasizing the values and limits of federalism, but also to learn about 







State Policy Examples and the Violence Against Women Act 
In 1994 the Violence Against Women Act became a part of the omnibus crime 
bill but provisions of the package, especially the policy of mandatory arrest in 
domestic abuse cases, were very controversial.  The bill had been delayed from 
passage and the chair of the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice in the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, Chuck Schumer, wanted to draw attention to its 
importance and try to move the crime bill along.  The hearing featured testimony by 
two state government witnesses, a Maryland state delegate and an official from the 
New York State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence.  The state official 
from New York was introduced by Representative Schumer from New York but there 
was no member of the Maryland delegation on the committee.   
Mr. Schumer explained that there were three reasons for the hearing: the first 
was to publicize the issue of domestic violence and put a personal face on the 
problem.  The next was to discuss the potential policy solution called mandatory 
arrest, which was part of the Violence Against Women Act but was very controversial 
and at risk of being removed from the conference report. The third was to highlight 
the Violence Against Women Act which had passed the House and Senate and was 
rolled into the omnibus crime bill that was still pending passage.  Mr. Schumer was 
an original cosponsor of the bill and wanted to prevent it from being watered down in 
the conference report.  He also wanted to influence the White House to take a stand 
on the crime bill.  Many members of the committee, including Senator Biden who 
testified in the hearing on behalf of the Senate version of the bill, were critical of the 




hearing would move the White House to action.  The committee was interested in the 
views of state government officials because the chair explained that the Violence 
Against Women Act would involve coordination across state lines by requiring states 
to recognize the protective orders issued by other states, incentivize states to treat 
domestic violence as a serious crime, and create a model state program encouraging 
comprehensive reform, arrest, prosecution, and judicial policies.   
Delegate DeJuliis of Maryland testified about her experience crafting, passing, 
and implementing the Maryland Domestic Violence Act of 1994.  She saw the major 
policy advances in Maryland as being police training so that police would tell abused 
women about their rights as well as services and shelters available to them.  Members 
of the subcommittee were interested in her political experience dealing with this issue 
as well as the details of policy implementation in Maryland.  Delegate DeJuliis was 
asked to respond to a question regarding the political argument that elements of the 
Violence Against Women Act were not part of the government‘s job.  She explained 
that in her view the government is an extension of the people and Maryland had the 
political will to address this issue because the people wanted action to reduce crime.  
Some committee members were concerned about the ability to implement the 
law since women often return to their abusers because of financial dependence or 
because they have children together.  The Maryland delegate explained that Maryland 
dealt with this problem by compelling women to testify against their abusers under 
certain circumstances and the state required abusers to be jailed but still allowed to 
work so they could support their family without being allowed to hurt their family.  




their perception of the improvements that needed to be made to their states‘ laws, 
especially funding for domestic abuse shelters. Several members of the committee 
asked detailed questions of the witness from the Maryland legislature to understand 
the strengths of Maryland‘s law.  One member asked the Maryland official for advice 
on what his state of Michigan could do to improve their state domestic abuse laws. 
The witness panel included members of non-profits as well as victims of domestic 
abuse but the witnesses that received the most questions from committee members 
were the state officials who discussed domestic violence laws in Maryland and New 
York. 
This first goal of this hearing was political.  The chair and some of the 
committee members felt that the hearing would have persuasive power to move the 
bill forward.  Several witnesses, including the Maryland delegate and members of the 
committee, also mentioned the goal of public awareness of domestic violence issues.  
They felt that domestic abuse was like the issue of drunk driving which was 
addressed through public policy but also through public awareness.  They agreed that 
the issue of domestic violence needed to be brought into the open and discussed so 
there would be fewer stigmas for victims and more support from government and law 
enforcement.   
Both state officials who were invited to testify were themselves victims of 
domestic abuse.  Though their prepared testimony included emotional discussions of 
their personal experiences and their professional policy experiences, the questions 
from members of the committee focused only on policy details in their states.  As 




putting a face on the policy problem but what seemed more valuable to the members 
of the committee was their state policy experience.  The intention of the hearing was 
not to learn about the innovative policies in Maryland and New York but the 
witnesses from these states did discuss their policies as well as their preference for a 




In asking what members of Congress want to learn from state government officials I 
found evidence that adds nuance to two theories of intergovernmental relations: the 
theory of states as interest groups and the theory of states as policy laboratories.  As 
interest groups, the image of state governments seeking more federal money and 
more policy flexibility isn‘t inaccurate but it dramatically simplifies the information 
sought by members of Congress and communicated by state witnesses.  As policy 
laboratories, there is further evidence that members of Congress are not seeking out 
the experiences of the most innovative state governments.  However, this does not 
mean that members of Congress don‘t want to learn from the policy experiences of 
the state witnesses.  Prior studies claiming that the federal government fails to learn 
from the laboratories of democracy may need to reconsider their definition of 
―learning‖.  Scholars looking at vertical policy learning have often limited their 
sample of hearings to legislative hearings in authorizing committees, but policy 
learning takes place during the oversight process and state policy experiments are 
discussed during the appropriations process. The policy process is ongoing and 




decisions about future legislation.  Members of Congress do not limit their learning to 
the policy adoption stage of the policy process but some scholars assume that this is 
the only time for measuring intergovernmental learning. 
The academic literature on lobbying and policy advocacy tends to focus on the 
bills that pass and the groups that influence the precise language in those bills.  
However, most of the hearings in this sample reflected an earlier stage in the policy 
process where the primary purpose was to determine what policy was working and 
what needed to change.  The committee was asking what the priorities of federal 
legislation should be.  What role should the federal government take in trying to solve 
certain problems?  What policies have been tried and what seems to be working in 
states and communities?  Does there need to be federal legislation for this problem, 
federal funding for state programs, or both?  Or are there some states implementing 
successful programs that just need a megaphone for their policy successes to gain 
attention and spread to other states?  Some of these questions would be best answered 
by featuring witnesses from states with innovative policy but many of the hearing‘s 
goals had political motives that were not dependent on learning from innovative 
states.  This is not to say that policy learning didn‘t take place when state witnesses 
testified, but there was limited evidence that members of Congress were trying to 
evaluate successful policies in the states and replicate the success at the federal level.  
The state witnesses in congressional hearings reflected the values, interests, and 
debates taking place in communities and statehouses around the country. To use a 




Congress to tell their stories and contribute their policy experiences to the ―garbage 
can‖ of policy solutions that inform the agenda-setting process (Kingdon 2003).  
Many of the policy experiences that were discussed by state witnesses were 
used to justify their policy preferences.  Some of these preferences fit within the 
traditional paradigm of intergovernmental relations where states sought more federal 
funds and fewer federal mandates but states also pursued other policy goals.  In the 
hearing on domestic violence the state witnesses wanted federal law that expanded 
protections and services for domestic abuse victims.  In the hearing on fair credit laws 
the state witnesses supported federal policy that provided protection for consumers 
and expressed their belief that the federal government had an important role to play in 
this policy area, as long as federal policy didn‘t preempt state laws.  In the hearing on 
water rights, as well as several other hearings on public land, forest, and water 
management, the state witnesses sought more cooperative administrative relationships 
between state and federal agencies.  Requests for increasing federal funding for state 
programs did come up in the hearing but this was far from the only goal of state 
witnesses.  In some hearings the need for federal money was never discussed and 
some state witnesses were willing to forgo federal dollars in order to retain the ability 
to administer a program without adhering to mandates attached to financial strings.   
The desire to build or strengthen cooperative relationships between state and 
federal agencies was a dominant theme in the testimony of state officials.  The 
administration of successful programs takes a tremendous level of coordination across 
federal, state, and local governments.  Many state government witnesses came to 




one of the stakeholders in the process of developing rules for policy implementation. 
The state governments wanted to be recognized as experts on the management of 
policy in their region and expected agencies to treat them as partners in program 
administration.  This was the subject of negative and positive testimony from state 
witnesses. When an agency was doing a good job of coordinating with state 
governments then the witnesses would give them credit and acknowledge their 
cooperative relationships.  But when those cooperative relationships did not exist or 
needed improvement the witnesses would use the hearing as a forum to address the 
problem with members of Congress and usually the representatives of federal 
agencies who were also testifying in the hearing.   
Observations from congressional hearings that featured testimony by state 
officials led to five generalizations about state government advocacy.  The first is that 
policy is complex and members of Congress have much to learn about the 
cooperative intergovernmental relationships and management that is necessary to 
achieve federal policy goals.  The second is that the members of Congress view the 
state officials as policy experts and they want to learn about the political feasibility 
and potential outcomes of policy.  The third is that members of Congress can 
represent their constituents while learning about state policy experiences.  Due to the 
potential for the policy priorities of the state to serve as a heuristic for the priorities of 
the citizens, members of Congress may find great value in learning from state 
officials in order to better represent their constituents.  The fourth is that even if 
hearings are serving a symbolic role by bringing media attention to an issue or 




members from learning about state policy. Members of Congress have limited time 
and an enormous workload so their time spent in committee hearings can be 
maximized to meet multiple goals.  Finally, many sources were able to speak about 
state policy experiments.  Examples of state innovations were given by members of 
Congress, local officials, activists, and industry representatives.  The greatest detail 
about state legislation, policy implementation, reforms, and intergovernmental 
cooperation was provided by state government witnesses. 
The tensions of the federal system are on display in congressional hearings 
featuring state witnesses.  Members of Congress face decisions between 
centralization and devolution.  They debate the competing values of equality and 
diversity in policy across the nation.  They see the benefits of uniformity but also the 
need for policy experimentation.  Some of these values are defined by ideology and 
political party but often they vary with the policy under discussion.  The state 
government witnesses provided detail and evidence to inform these discussions.  
Their discussion of cooperative policy development and implementation involving 
state, local, federal, and private interests supported the description of the states as the 
―linchpin of the federal system‖(Grady 1987).   
This does not mean that state expertise is utilized fully in federal 
policymaking.  Prior studies have indicated that intergovernmental learning was 
limited and the ideal of using the federal structure to try out policy experiments in the 
states was unfulfilled.  I do not refute these findings but I do recommend that scholars 
consider closely what they mean by ―policy learning‖.  In a political system where 




unrealistic to expect members of Congress to consistently seek out the testimony of 
the most innovative state governments.  Their electoral incentive is to represent their 
own constituents.   This will understandably constrain the extent to which they seek 
out examples of innovative policy in other jurisdictions.   They are interested in 
learning about state policy experiences but they are unlikely to engage in an 
exhaustive search for the most novel policy solutions in all of the states.  Some 
committee chairs did demonstrate an interest in hearing from many state government 
officials during the process of crafting federal policy but they were often interested in 
the officials‘ policy preferences, not in replicating the states‘ policy experiments.  
This chapter provides evidence that the role played by state governments in 
congressional policymaking is that of policy advocates, much like other interest 















Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 “As you might perceive from the title [Tennessee Advisory Council on 
Intergovernmental Relations], we are concerned about basically policy issues dealing 
with intergovernmental issues.  And one of the exercises that we at the staff go 
through periodically is trying to determine if there are any issues in the public sector 
that are not intergovernmental.  We do not often identify any.  So we have 
perspectives of Federal, State, and local on almost every issue.”  
(Testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Dr. Harry Green, 
President of the Tennessee Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations p. 76) 
 
The above quotation reminds us that policymaking in the American federal 
system is complex and the levels of government are interdependent when crafting, 
implementing, and evaluating public policy.  This study has explored the roles that 
state government officials play in congressional policymaking.  One of these roles is 
that the states can act as interest groups, individually or in coalitions through public 
official associations.  This behavior is intended to express the policy preferences of 
state governments and safeguard the power of the states in the system of federalism.  
The other is that states may act as policy laboratories, educating members of 
Congress about their policy innovations.  This information is intended to help 
members of congress make informed decisions about federal policy based on the 
experiences in the state governments. The relationships between the states and the 
federal government play out in congressional committee hearings when state officials 
are invited to testify before members of Congress.  The topics of these hearings and 
the interactions between witnesses and members provide a resource for understanding 







Public Official Associations 
Prior research on the intergovernmental lobby has focused on the behavior and policy 
positions of the public official associations representing state governments.  These 
organizations are important actors in intergovernmental relations but the scholarly 
tradition of studying these interest groups, without considering the behavior of 
individual state governments, distorts our perception of intergovernmental influence 
in federal policymaking. There are times when the states will be in agreement on 
desired policy outcomes and in these cases the public official associations can speak 
for the states with a legitimate, unified voice.  Often the states are agreed on issues of 
federalism in public policy.  The associations were active in hearings categorized as 
dealing with government operations and intergovernmental relations.  The 
associations expressed the position that the federal government should avoid 
preempting state laws or imposing unfunded mandates on the state governments.  
They represented the states as important stakeholders in federal policy and advocated 
for strong cooperative relationships between state and federal agencies.  However, the 
individual state governments were motivated by regional interests and particularistic 
policy positions to participate as individual entities in the federal policy process apart 
from the associations. 
 Some of the motivations for individual state participation were related to 
differences in policy goals, driven by partisanship or geography.  Sometimes 
agreements on the principles of federalism were not enough to prevent policy dissent 




State Legislatures testified in opposition to new air quality standards that were 
established by the Environmental Protection Agency.  They argued that the standards 
would be costly for the states and would not provide enough flexibility to individual 
states with varying air conditions.  A witness from New Hampshire disagreed with 
this position primarily because the Northeastern states felt that strict air quality 
standards on all of the states were necessary to prevent their states from suffering the 
effects of pollution drifting from other areas.   
 In addition to particularistic concerns that divided the interests of the states, 
the state governments were also likely to participate in federal policymaking because 
they could develop policy positions more quickly than the associations.  As 
consensus-oriented organizations with a committee system for adopting policy 
positions, the associations were slow-moving organizations.  They were capable of 
speaking for the states on policies where they had long been active and had 
established consensus among their members but they were unable to respond quickly 
to new policy debates.  In 2003, when the George W. Bush administration announced 
a new proposal for Medicaid reform, the state governors were able to quickly craft 
responses while the National Governors Association was still planning to meet and 
vote on their position.  In another example, a hearing on improving the enforcement 
of Tenth Amendment protections in congressional policymaking illustrated that even 
when associations agree on the principle of the policy they might still be unprepared 
to take a position on the policy.  During this hearing the committee members asked 
South Carolina Attorney General Charles Condon if the National Association of 




Condon expressed his hope that the association would do so but said that the 
organization had just begun to discuss the legislation and had not yet decided to vote 
on an official position. 
 State governments relate to their public official associations in a way that is 
quite similar to business interest groups that work together through trade associations 
(Lowery and Gray 1998) and they exhibit many of the same patterns in their behavior 
within the intergovernmental lobby.  Scholars of federalism should be attentive to 
these behaviors when studying intergovernmental interests and avoid using the policy 
positions of public official associations as a representation of the unified interests of 
the states. 
 
Innovation and Representation 
There is quite a bit of variation in the advocacy activity of the individual state 
governments.  Some states are frequently represented in congressional hearings by 
their government officials while others are rarely heard.  Chapter 3 investigated two 
theories that explain some of this variation.  One explanation is that state officials will 
appear more frequently before committees on which a member of their congressional 
delegation serves.  The other is that the states with the greatest capacity to craft 
innovative public policy will most often testify in congressional hearings.  The results 
suggest that that at least in some of the committees, primarily those in the House of 
Representatives, more innovative states are invited to testify more often than less 




link between the committee assignments of a state‘s congressional delegation and that 
state‘s frequency of testimony.   
 These results are consistent with prior studies that have found limited 
evidence that the federal government is learning from the laboratories of democracy.  
Studies of health policy have been especially critical of the failure to adopt 
innovations from the states (C. S. Weissert and Scheller 2008; Thompson and Burke 
2007).  Even so, it would be valuable for scholars to reconsider the variables that are 
used to measure state policy innovation.  A recent attempt to move beyond measures 
of state capacity for policy innovation, such as legislative professionalism and 
urbanization, resulted in a new measure of actual policy innovation (Boehmke and 
Skinner 2012).  The new measure follows in the footsteps of prior scholars measuring 
state innovation as the ―adoption-proneness‖ of the state legislature (Savage 1978, 
212).  This measure captures the relative policy activity in each state but it is 
calculated by observing policy adoptions across many issue areas and does not 
indicate whether a state might have been a leader on one particular issue.  The results 
from this chapter do not support the theory that members of Congress are consistently 
inviting officials from the most innovative state governments to testify in committee 
hearings.  However, scholars should also reflect on what is really measured using the 
current constructs for state policy innovation.  Further research is needed to develop 







Learning from the States? 
The results of the models in chapter 3 called for further investigation of the 
relationship between members of Congress and the state witnesses testifying in 
hearings.  If members of Congress are motivated to invite witnesses from their own 
state governments rather than seeking out witnesses from states with the most 
innovative public policies then is the testimony of these witnesses primarily political 
or does policy learning occur in these interactions?  What purpose do state 
government witnesses serve in congressional hearings?  Chapter 4 considers the text 
of congressional hearings in which testimony was heard from state government 
officials.  The message of the testimony and the interaction between witnesses and the 
committee members support a conclusion that policy learning does occur, though the 
members of Congress are interested in political goals as well.   
 Some hearings demonstrated that policy innovation was an important factor in 
the invitation of state witnesses.  The example that opened chapter 1, in which 
witnesses from eight states offered testimony about their implementation of child 
support enforcement programs, was an example of state innovations on display.  Each 
of the eight state witnesses was distinguished for their development of a successful 
program meeting the federal legislative goals.  The committee members indicated that 
they wanted to learn from the successful state policies in order to inform future 
federal policymaking.  Other hearings seemed to be an extension of Congress 
member‘s constituent service, such as the hearing in which Senator Ron Wyden of 
Oregon heard the testimony of Oregon state and local officials in a field hearing in his 




hearing but Wyden was the only member present and his interaction focused only on 
Oregon‘s experience balancing environmental goals and agricultural needs.  He 
expressed a great deal of interest in learning from the witnesses but all of the 
witnesses in the hearing were government officials and constituents from his own 
state.  Most hearings with state government witnesses represented a mix of 
policymaker‘s goals.  They frequently featured interactions between state witnesses 
and members of the state‘s congressional delegation but they also involved thoughtful 
questions from committee members about the state‘s policy successes and the state 
witness‘ suggestions for federal policy.   
In the complex policy environment of Washington D.C. the state government 
witnesses help members of Congress to meet multiple goals simultaneously.  
Interactions in the hearings indicated that members of Congress were seeking to 
advance their preferred policy outcomes, demonstrate public activity on issues of 
importance to their constituents, evaluate the success of federal programs being 
implemented by the states, learn about problems in the states and whether these 
problems need federal policy solutions, and learn about what state governments are 
doing to solve societal problems.  When state government officials testified in a 
hearing it was nearly certain that one of the points of discussion would be the role that 
the state and federal governments should play on that issue.   
Members of Congress inquired about different information from members of 
state governments than they did from the constituents of their states or districts who 
testified in the hearings.  All witnesses could talk about problems that needed policy 




functional aspects of the policy solutions that few other witnesses provided.  Two of 
the most common recurring themes of state witness testimony were related to the 
structures of federalism: the policy roles that should be played by federal, state, and 
local officials and the cooperative relationships that were needed between state and 
federal agencies for program implementation.  States often gave examples of their 
policy innovations but these were frequently offered as evidence to support their 
desired design of federal legislation and less frequently as examples of innovations 
that the federal government should itself adopt. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
If we begin with the premise that the testimony of state government officials should 
primarily educate federal lawmakers about state innovations to support the goal of 
crafting good federal policy then these results may prove disappointing.  In this 
scenario we would expect that members of Congress would learn about policy 
experiments from the state governments with the resources and inclination to craft 
creative solutions to societal problems.  This would allow members of Congress to 
consider the way that problems are perceived in the states, how solutions are crafted, 
and whether these solutions are effective.  But members of Congress have other goals 
besides crafting good policy.  They are also representatives of a geographic 
constituency tied to one state, or a part of one state.  They have an electoral 
connection that incentivizes knowledge of the problems and needs of their own state 
more so than the other states in the federal system.  Members of Congress may see 




the policy experiences in their own states before seeking out innovations from around 
the country. 
These constraints on members of Congress reflect the common limitations of 
public policymaking in an environment where time and resources are at a premium.  
Members of Congress cannot consider every option that is possible when deciding 
which policy to adopt in order to solve a problem.  They choose from the options that 
are already familiar to them and make incremental changes to policies that are already 
in place (Lindblom 1959; 1979).  Lindblom calls this process ―muddling through‖ 
and it is a realistic picture of policymaking in a system where policy options are 
constrained by politics and by the cognitive and resource limitations of lawmakers.  A 
system that incentivizes attention to one state will inherently limit the range of state 
policy experiments that federal lawmakers consider.   It is unrealistic to expect that 
any aspect of policymaking in a representative legislative body is conducted outside 
of the political environment.  In this way, learning from the laboratories of 
democracy, just like all policy learning, is constrained by the dual pressures of 
representation and good governance.  Members of Congress may want to learn about 
innovative state policy experiments but they also need to represent their own 
geographic constituency. We can expect that they will first look for policy examples 
from their home state. 
Scholars of intergovernmental relations have established different definitions 
for what it means for the federal government to learn from state policy.  Some 
research has surveyed federal lawmakers to see how many were aware of state 




have looked at aggregate state legislative agendas to see if the policy priorities of the 
states were reflected in the federal policy agenda (Lowery, Gray, and Baumgartner 
2011).  And still others have looked for evidence that the federal government is 
replicating state policy when crafting federal law (C. S. Weissert and Scheller 2008; 
Boeckelman 1992).  The basis of all of these studies is that the policy experiences of 
the states should be informative to federal lawmakers.  But not all scholars have 
focused on learning about state policy innovations as the normative purpose of 
intergovernmental relations.  Many believe that the interaction of state and federal 
officials is an important aspect of maintaining the balance of power in the federal 
system (Nugent 2009; Bednar 2009; T. Smith 2008). 
If we accept that state government participation in federal lawmaking should 
provide an opportunity to educate federal officials about the policy needs in the states, 
the proper role of the various governments, and the cooperative relationships that are 
needed for successful policy implementation, then the results of this study are more 
optimistic.  These chapters demonstrate support for the theory that state participation 
in congressional hearings is a safeguard of the balance of power in the system of 
federalism.  The presence of state officials in a hearing virtually ensures that the 
values of federalism are discussed by witnesses and committee members.  Sometimes 
this takes a philosophical turn, where the size and scope of federal authority is 
debated, and sometimes the conversation is more practical by considering the 
administrative details and relationships necessary at each level of government to meet 
the policy goals.  In this way, the testimony of state officials reminded federal 




Their financial and administrative needs for the successful implementation of federal 
law should not be forgotten.  Many non-governmental witnesses, and even the 
members of Congress on the committee, could provide examples of policy 
experiences in the states, but none spoke with the precision of the state officials 
themselves.  Representatives of the public official associations discussed the general 
principles of federalism.  They encouraged the central government to avoid unfunded 
mandates on the states or preemption of state laws, but the individual state 
governments provided persuasive examples from their policy experiences to justify 
federal attention to their interests. 
This study does not attempt to measure the influence of the state governments 
on federal policy but it does indicate that the testimony of state officials in 
congressional hearings serves the purpose of safeguarding the balance of state-federal 
power.  The tensions of the federal system, the struggle between the values of 
uniformity and experimentation and between equality and diversity, are represented 
when state officials testify on Capitol Hill.  If we expect that congressional 
policymaking should be a deliberative process that considers the role and purpose of 
federal policy and the needs of the states, then the hearings with state government 
witnesses filled that role.  Whether the state governments are sufficiently represented 
in federal policymaking is a question that warrants future study.  This project has 
established that the individual states play a more prominent role in federal 
policymaking than the public official associations.  It demonstrated that there is a 
relationship between the state witnesses invited to testify and their state congressional 




innovative state policy in congressional hearings but it does not preclude federal 
lawmakers from learning about state policy experiences.  These hearings represent a 
forum for state governments to discuss the important work they do to solve problems 
in their own jurisdictions and educate federal lawmakers about the role played by the 


















Appendix: Hearings Referenced 
 
 
Date Committee and Intergovernmental Witnesses Hearing Title 
July-93 
Subcommittee on Environment and Natural Resources, House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Endangered Species Act 
Reauthorization: San Antonio 
 
Rick Perry, Commissioner Texas Department of Agriculture   
  Larry McKinney, Director Texas Department of Park and Wildlife   
October-93 
Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance, House Banking, 
Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee 
H.R. 1015; the Consumer 
Reporting Reform Act of 1993 
State 
Witness: Roland Burris, Attorney General, Illinois 
 
 
Joseph Curran, Jr. Attorney General, Maryland 
 
June-94 
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, House Committee on 
the Judiciary 
Domestic Violence: Not Just a 
Family Matter 
 
Karla Digirolamo, Executive Director, New York State Office for the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence   
  Connie DeJuliis, State Representative, Maryland   
July-94 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on 
Natural Resources 
Water Use Practices on 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Projects 
State 
Witness: Reed Marbut, Administrator, Oregon Department of Water Resources 
 
August-94 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and 
Deposit Insurance and the Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and 
Insurance, House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs 
Ways of Increasing Access of 
Low-and Moderate-Income 
Americans to Financial 
Services 
 
Elizabeth Randall, Commissioner New Jersey Department of Banking   
  
Dale Brown, Project Director, Maryland Department of Human 
Resources   
February-95 House Committee on the Judiciary 
Product Liability and Legal 
Reform 
 




Subcommittee on Disability Policy, Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources 
Reauthorization Hearings of 
the IDEA 
 
Joseph Fisher, Executive Director of Special Education, Tennessee 
Department of Education   
February-96 Subcommittee on Youth Violence, Senate Judiciary Committee 
Youth Violence: Developing 
Local and State Solutions 
 
Don Sundquist, Governor of Tennessee 
 
 
George Hattaway, Commissioner Tennessee Department of Health 
 
 
Beth Harwell, State Representative Tennessee 
 
 
Douglas Henry, State Senator Tennessee 
 
 
Page Walley, State Senator Tennessee 
 
March-96 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
S. 1629: The Tenth 
Amendment Enforcement Act 
of 1996 
 
Michael Box, State Representative Alabama   
  Eldon Mulder, Alaska State Legislature   




  Charles Condon, Attorney General South Carolina   
  Timothy Tymkovich, Solicitor General Colorado   
  Patrick Sweeney, State Representative Ohio   
  Douglas Henry, State Senator Tennessee   
  
Harry Green, President of Tennessee Advisory Council of 
Intergovernmental Relations   
  
Robert Foster Jr., Deputy Director, Tennessee Department of 
Environment and Conservation   
April-96 
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, 
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 




Kathleen Townsend, Lieutenant Governor Maryland 
 
July-96 Subcommittee on Youth Violence, Senate Judiciary Committee 
Images, Reality, and Solutions 
to the Violent Juvenile Crime 
Problem 
 
Heather Wilson, Secretary New Mexico Department of Children, 
Youth, and Families   
April-97 
Subcommittee on Human Resources, House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight 
Health Care Fraud in Nursing 
Homes 
 
Carolyn Melory, Director Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, Maryland 
 
 
Steven Wiggs, Director Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, Arizona 
 
 
Stephen Spahr, Deputy Attorney General, New York State 
 
 




Subcommittee on Health and Environment, House Committee on 
Commerce 
Review of EPA's Proposed 
Ozone and Particulate Matter 
NAAQS Revisions, Part 2 
 
Craig Peterson, Majority Leader Utah Senate   
  Tom Alley, Michigan House of Representatives   
  Richard Russman, New Hampshire State Senate   
  Richard Brodsky, New York State Representative   
  Alan Kujovich, Pennsylvania State Senator   
November-
97 
Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic Preservation, and 
Recreation, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
National Parks Restoration 
Plan 
 
James Geringer, Governor Wyoming 
 
 
Donald Murphy, Director of Parks and Recreation, California 
Resources Agency 
 
July-98 Subcommittee on the Constitution, House Committee on the Judiciary 
Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention 
Act of 1998 
 
John Kitzhaer, Governor Oregon   
February-99 
Subcommittee on Transportation Appropriations, House Committee on 
Appropriations 
Department of Transportation 
and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 2000, Part 
4 
 
Harry Eubanks, Motor Carrier Safety Enforcement, Oregon 
Department of Transportation 
 
March-99 Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
Gaming Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1999, 
part 1 
 
Raymond Scheppach, Executive Director, National Governors 






Subcommittee on Human Resources, House Committee on Ways and 
Means 
Oversight of the Child Support 
Enforcement Program 
 
Laura Kadwell, Director Minnesota Department of Human Services 
 
 
Nick Young, Director Virginia Department of Social Services 
 
 
Marilyn Smith, Associate Deputy Commissioner, Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue 
 
 












Robert Leuba, Chief Court Administrator Connecticut Supreme Court 
 
 




Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations, Senate Appropriations 
Form of Real Estate Fraud 
Known As Flipping, Special 
Hearing 
 
Carolyn Krysiak, State Representative Maryland   
  Maggie Mintosh, State Representative, Maryland   
  Samuel Rosenberg, State Representative, Maryland   
March-00 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on 
Education and the Workforce 
Putting Performance First: 
Academic Accountability and 
School Choice in Florida 
 
Tom Gallagher, Commissioner of Education Florida 
 
July-01 House Committee on Resources 
H.R. 701, the Conservation 
and Reinvestment Act; and 
H.R. 1592, the Constitutional 
Land Acquisition Act 
 
Jack Caldwell, Secretary Louisiana Department of Natural Resources   
  
Philip McNelly, Director North Carolina Division of Parks and 
Recreation   
  David Waller, Georgia Wildlife Resources Division   
  
Edward Sanderson, Director Rhode Island Historic Preservation and 
Heritage Commission   
May-02 
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests, Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources Steen Mountain Act 
 
Ted Ferrioli, State Senator Oregon 
 
 
Tom Brumm, Manager of Intergovernmental Relations, Oregon 
Department of Economic and Community Development 
 
May-02 
Subcommittee on National Parks, Recreation, and Public Lands, House 
Committee on Resources 
H.R. 3786, H.R. 3942 and 
H.R. 4622 
 
Todd Davidson, Executive Director Oregon Tourism Commission   
March-03 Subcommittee on Health, House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
Medicaid Today: The States' 
Perspective 
 
Jeb Bush, Governor, Florida 
 
 
John Rowland, Governor, Connecticut 







Arnold, David, and Jeremy F. Plant. 1994. Public Official Associations and State and 
Local Government : a Bridge Across One Hundred Years. Fairfax  Va.: 
George Mason University Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank. 2005. ―The Growth and Diversity of U.S. Associations 1956-
2004: Analyzing Trends Using the Encyclopedia of Associations‖. Working 
Paper. 
Baumgartner, Frank, Jeffrey R. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth 
L. Leech. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change : Who Wins, Who Loses, and 
Why. Chicago ;;London: University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 2001. ―Interest Niches and Policy 
Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics.‖ 
The Journal of Politics 63 (04): 1191–1213. doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00106. 
Bednar, Jenna. 2009. The Robust Federation: Principles of Design. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Beer, Samuel. 1978. ―Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America.‖ The 
American Political Science Review 72 (1): 9. 
Berkman, Michael B. 1993. ―Former State Legislators in the U. S. House of 
Representatives: Institutional and Policy Mastery.‖ Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 18 (1) (February 1): 77–104. doi:10.2307/440027. 
———. 1994. The State Roots of National Politics: Congress and the Tax Agenda, 
1978–1986. University of Pittsburgh Pre. 
Berry, Jeffrey, and Clyde Wilcox. 2009. The Interest Group Society. 5th ed. New 
York: Pearson/Longman. 
Binder, Sarah A. 1997. Minority Rights Majority Rule: Partisanship and the 
Development of Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Boeckelman, Keith. 1992. ―The Influence Of States On Federal Policy Adoptions.‖ 
Policy Studies Journal 20 (3): 365–375. doi:10.1111/j.1541-
0072.1992.tb00164.x. 
Boehmke, Frederick J., and Paul Skinner. 2012. ―State Policy Innovativeness 






Boehmke, Frederick J., and Richard Witmer. 2004. ―Disentangling Diffusion: The 
Effects of Social Learning and Economic Competition on State Policy 
Innovation and Expansion.‖ Political Research Quarterly 57 (1) (March 1): 
39–51. doi:10.2307/3219833. 
Bowman, Ann O‘M, and Richard C. Kearney. 2010. State and Local Government. 8th 
ed. Wadsworth Publishing. 
Breton, Albert. 1991. ―The Existence and Stability of Interjurisdictional 
Competition.‖ In Competition Among States and Local Governments, edited 
by Daphne Kenyon and John Kincaid, 37–56. Washington  D.C.: The Urban 
Institute Press. 
Buchanan, James M. 1997. ―Albert Breton, Competitive Governments: An Economic 
Theory of Politics and Public Finance.‖ Public Choice 93 (3-4) (December 1): 
523–524. doi:10.1023/A:1004935119366. 
Burnett, Edmund C. 1964. Continental Congress. New York: Norton. 
Burstein, Paul, and Elizabeth Hirsh. 2007. ―Interest Organizations, Information, and 
Policy Innovation in the U.S. Congress.‖ Sociological Forum 22 (2) (June): 
174–174–199. doi:10.1111/j.1573-7861.2007.00012.x. 
Cammisa, Anne. 1995. Governments as Interest Groups : Intergovernmental 
Lobbying and the Federal System. Westport  Conn.: Praeger. 
Cox, Gary W, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible 
Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Davidson, Roger H., Walter J. Oleszek, and Frances E. Lee. 2011. Congress and Its 
Members. 13th ed. CQ Press College. 
Deering, Christopher J., and Steven S. Smith. 1997. Committees in Congress. 3 Sub. 
CQ Press. 
Derthick, Martha. 2001. Keeping the Compound Republic : Essays on American 
Federalism. Washington  D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Dinan, John. 1997. ―State Government Influence in the National Policy Process: 
Lessons from the 104th Congress.‖ Publius: The Journal of Federalism 27 (2) 
(March 20): 129 –142. 
———. 2011. ―Shaping Health Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.‖ Publius: The Journal of Federalism 41 




Elazar, Daniel. 1962. The American Partnership  Intergovernmental Co-operation in 
the Nineteenth-century United States. [Chicago]: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1991. ―Cooperative Federalism.‖ In Competition Among States and Local 
Governments, edited by Daphne Kenyon and John Kincaid, 65–86. 
Washington  D.C.: The Urban Institute Press. 
Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1994. Statehouse 
Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Esterling, Kevin M. 2009. ―Does the Federal Government Learn from the States? 
Medicaid and the Limits of Expertise in the Intergovernmental Lobby.‖ 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 39 (1) (January 1): 1 –21. 
doi:10.1093/publius/pjn025. 
Fenno, Richard. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. HarperCollins. 
Fenno, Richard F. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Little, Brown. 
Grady, Dennis O. 1987. ―Gubernatorial Behavior in State-Federal Relations.‖ The 
Western Political Quarterly 40 (2) (June): 305–318. 
———. 2004. ―U.S. State Agencies as a Lobbying Force.‖ In Research Guide to U.S. 
and International Interest Groups, edited by Clive S. Thomas, 225–226. 
Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Gray, Virginia. 1973. ―Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study.‖ The American 
Political Science Review 67 (4) (December): 1174. doi:10.2307/1956539. 
Grodzins, Morton. 1966. The American System  a New View of Government in the 
United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Grumm, John G. 1971. ―The Effects of Legislative Structure on Legislative 
Performance.‖ In State and Urban Politics, edited by Richard Hofferbert and 
Ira Sharkansky. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. 
Haider, Donald. 1974. When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, 
and Intergovernmental Lobbying,. New York: Free Press. 
Hall, Richard L., and Alan Deardorff. 2006. ―Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.‖ 
American Political Science Review 100 (1) (February 1): 69–84. 
Hanmer, Michael J., and Kerem Ozan Kalkan. 2013. ―Behind the Curve: Clarifying 
the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects 
from Limited Dependent Variable Models.‖ American Journal of Political 




Herian, Mitchel. 2011. Governing the States and the Nation : the Intergovernmental 
Policy Influence of the National Governors Association. Amherst  N.Y.: 
Cambria Press. 
Herrnson, Paul S. 2007. Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in 
Washington. 5th ed. CQ Press. 
Hunt, Valerie, Bryan Jones, Frank Baumgartner, and Michael Rosensteihl. 2010. 
―Congressional Hearings Data Codebook.‖ 
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks. 
Jensen, Jennifer M. 2010. ―More Than Just the Money: Why Some (But Not All) 
States Have a Branch Office in Washington.‖ In  Chicago, IL. 
Jensen, Jennifer M., and Jenna Kelkres Emery. 2011. ―The First State Lobbyists: 
State Offices in Washington During World War II.‖ Journal of Policy History 
23 (2): 117–149. 
Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How 
Government Prioritizes Problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ka, Sangjoon, and Paul Teske. 2002. ―Ideology and Professionalism Electricity 
Regulation and Deregulation Over Time in the American States.‖ American 
Politics Research 30 (3) (May 1): 323–343. 
doi:10.1177/1532673X02030003006. 
Karch, Andrew. 2007a. ―Emerging Issues and Future Directions in State Policy 
Diffusion Research.‖ State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7 (1): 54–80. 
———. 2007b. Democratic Laboratories: Policy Diffusion Among the American 
States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
———. 2010. ―Vertical Diffusion and the Policy-Making Process: The Politics of 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research.‖ Political Research Quarterly (October 27). 
doi:10.1177/1065912910385252. 
http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/10/22/1065912910385252. 
Key, V.O. 1956. American State Politics: An Introduction. [1st ed.]. New York: 
Knopf. 
Kincaid, John. 1991. ―The Competitive Challenge to Federalism: A Theory of Federal 
Democracy.‖ In Competition Among States and Local Governments, edited by 
Daphne Kenyon and John Kincaid, 87–114. Washington  D.C.: The Urban 
Institute Press. 





Kousser, Thad. 2005. Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative 
Professionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kramer, Larry D. 2000. ―Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism.‖ Columbia Law Review 100 (1) (January 1): 215–293. 
doi:10.2307/1123559. 
Ladewig, Jeffrey W., and Mathew P. Jasinski. 2008. ―On the Causes and 
Consequences of and Remedies for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. 
House of Representatives.‖ Perspectives on Politics 6 (01): 89–107. 
doi:10.1017/S1537592708080080. 
Leary, Mal. 2012. ―LaPage Pulls Out of National Governors Association.‖ Bangor 
Daily News, September 30. 
http://bangordailynews.com/2012/09/30/politics/lepage-pulls-out-of-national-
governors-association/?ref=mostReadBoxNews. 
Leckrone, J. Wesley, and Justin Gollob. 2010. ―Telegrams to Washington.‖ State and 
Local Government Review 42 (3) (December 1): 235 –245. 
doi:10.1177/0160323X10384747. 
Lee, Frances, and Bruce Oppenheimer. 1999. Sizing up the Senate : the Unequal 
Consequences of Equal Representation. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Leyden, Kevin M. 1995. ―Interest Group Resources and Testimony at Congressional 
Hearings.‖ Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (3) (August 1): 431–439. 
doi:10.2307/440230. 
Lindblom, Charles E. 1959. ―The Science of ‗Muddling Through‘.‖ Public 
Administration Review 19 (2): 79–88. 
———. 1979. ―Still Muddling, Not Yet Through.‖ Public Administration Review 39 
(6) (December): 517–526. 
Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. 1998. ―The Dominance of Institutions in Interest 
Representation: A Test of Seven Explanations.‖ American Journal of Political 
Science 42 (1) (January 1): 231–255. doi:10.2307/2991754. 
Lowery, David, Virginia Gray, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2011. ―Policy Attention in 
State and Nation: Is Anyone Listening to the Laboratories of Democracy?‖ 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 41 (2): 286–310. 
doi:10.1093/publius/pjq039. 
Mooney, Christopher Z. 1991. ―Information Sources in State Legislative Decision 




Morehouse, Sarah M., and Malcolm E. Jewell. 2004. ―States as Laboratories: A 
Reprise.‖ Annual Review of Political Science. 7: 177–204. 
Mossberger, Karen. 1999. ―State-Federal Diffusion and Policy Learning: From 
Enterprise Zones to Empowerment Zones.‖ Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 29 (3) (June 20): 31–50. 
Nugent, John. 2009. Safeguarding Federalism : How States Protect Their Interests 
in National Policymaking. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
O‘Toole, Laurence. 2007. American Intergovernmental Relations : Foundations, 
Perspectives, and Issues. 4th ed. Washington  D.C.: CQ Press. 
Ornstein, Norman J., Thomas Mann, and Michael Malbin. 2008. Vital Statistics on 
Congress 2008. Washington  D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Palazzolo, Daniel J., and James W. Ceaser. 2005. Election Reform: Politics and 
Policy. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Pelissero, John P., and Robert E. England. 1987. ―State and Local Governments‘ 
Washington ‗Reps‘: Lobbying Strategies and President Reagan‘s New 
Federalism.‖ State & Local Government Review 19 (2): 68–72. 
Peterson, Paul E. 1995. The Price of Federalism. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Posner, Paul. 1998. The Politics of Unfunded Mandates : Whither Federalism? 
Washington  D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Rabinowitz, Aaron, and Miriam Laugesen. 2010. ―Niche Players in Health Policy: 
Medical Specialty Societies in Congress 1969–2002.‖ Social Science & 
Medicine 71 (7) (October): 1341–1348. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.06.035. 
Riker, William H. 1955. ―The Senate and American Federalism.‖ The American 
Political Science Review 49 (2) (June 1): 452–469. doi:10.2307/1951814. 
Sachs, Richard C. 2004. ―Hearings in the U.S. Senate: A Guide for Preparation and 
Procedure‖. CRS Report for Congress RL30548. Washington  D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 
http://lieberman.senate.gov/assets/pdf/crs/senatehearings.pdf. 
Sachs, Richard C., and Carol Hardy Vincent. 1999. ―Hearings in the House of 
Representatives: A Guide for Preparation and Conduct‖. CRS Report for 
Congress 96-623 GOV. Washington  D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 





Salisbury, Robert. 1984. ―Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions.‖ 
The American Political Science Review 78 (1): 64. 
Savage, Robert L. 1978. ―Policy Innovativeness as a Trait of American States.‖ The 
Journal of Politics 40 (01): 212–224. doi:10.2307/2129985. 
Sbragia, Alberta. 2006. ―American Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.‖ In 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, 239–260. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Schattschneider, E. 1960. The Semisovereign People : a Realist’s View of 
Democracy in America. New York: Holt  Rinehart and Winston. 
Schiller, Wendy. 2000. Partners and Rivals : Representation in U.S. Senate 
Delegations. Princeton  N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Schlozman, Kay, and John Tierney. 1986. Organized Interests and American 
Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. 
Schneier, Edward V., and Beatram Gross. 1993. Legislative Strategy: Shaping Public 
Policy. New York: St. Martin‘s Press. 
Scott, Dylan. 2012. ―Obama, Romney Spar on Medicaid in Frist Debate.‖ Nation, 
October 4. http://www.governing.com/news/politics/gov-obama-romney-spar-
on-medicaid-in-first-debate.html. 
Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. 2006. ―Bottom-up Federalism: The Diffusion 
of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States.‖ American Journal of 
Political Science 50 (4) (October): 825–843. 
———. 2008. ―The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion.‖ American Journal of Political 
Science 52 (4): 840–857. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00346.x. 
Sinclair, Barbara. 2000. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Process in the U.S. 
Congress. 2nd Edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Smith, Steven S., and Christopher J. Deering. 1983. ―Changing Motives for 
Committee Preferences of New Members of the U. S. House.‖ Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 8 (2) (May 1): 271–281. doi:10.2307/439433. 
Smith, Troy. 2008. ―Intergovernmental Lobbying in the Twenty-First Century.‖ In 
Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century, edited by Timonthy J. 
Conlan and Paul Posner, 310–337. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press. 
Squire, Peverill. 1992. ―Legislative Professionalism and Membership Diversity in 




———. 1998. ―Membership Turnover and the Efficient Processing of Legislation.‖ 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 23 (1) (February 1): 23–32. 
doi:10.2307/440212. 
———. 2007. ―Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index 
Revisited.‖ State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7 (2): 211–227. 
Steuerle, C. Eugene, Edward Gramlich, Hugh Heclo, and Demetra Smith Nightingale. 
1998. ―Who Does What? The Change Shape of U.S. Federalism.‖ In The 
Government We Deserve: Responsive Democracy and Changing 
Expectations. Washington  D.C.: The Urban Institute Press. 
Sulkin, Tracy. 2005. Issue Politics in Congress. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Thompson, Frank J., and Courtney Burke. 2007. ―Executive Federalism and Medicaid 
Demonstration Waivers: Implications for Policy and Democratic Process.‖ 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 32 (6) (December 1): 971–1004. 
doi:10.1215/03616878-2007-039. 
―Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act Coverage.‖ 2004. Report to the 
Chairman, subommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committe on Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate. Washington  D.C.: United States General Accounting 
Office. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04637.pdf. 
Volden, Craig. 2006. ―States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the 
Children‘s Health Insurance Program.‖ American Journal of Political Science 
50 (2) (April): 294–312. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00185.x. 
Volden, Craig, Michael M. Ting, and Daniel P. Carpenter. 2008. ―A Formal Model of 
Learning and Policy Diffusion.‖ American Political Science Review 102 (3): 
319–332. 
Walker, Jack L. 1969. ―The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States.‖ 
The American Political Science Review 63 (3): 880–899. 
doi:10.2307/1954434. 
Weissert, Carol S., and Daniel Scheller. 2008. ―Learning from the States? Federalism 
and National Health Policy.‖ Public Administration Review 68 (s1) (October 
21): S162–S174. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00986.x. 
Weissert, William G., and Carol S. Weissert. 2012. Governing Health: The Politics of 
Health Policy. JHU Press. 
Wisdom, John Minor. 1984. ―Foreword:  The Ever-Whirling Wheels of American 




Wright, Deil. 1978. Understanding Intergovernmental Relations : Public Policy and 
Participants’ Perspectives in Local, State, and National Governments. North 
Scituate  Mass.: Duxbury Press. 
 
